The Protection of Works Created by Artificial Intelligence Algorithms in the United States and the European Union by Juuti, Aleksi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE PROTECTION OF WORKS CREATED BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
ALGORITHMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Master’s Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aleksi Juuti 
Intellectual Property Shaping Society 
University of Turku 
Faculty of Law 
May 18, 2020 
2 
 
Abstract 
UNIVERSITY OF TURKU 
Faculty of Law 
ALEKSI JUUTI: The Protection of Works Created by Artificial Intelligence Algorithms in the 
United States and the European Union 
Master’s Thesis, 70 p. 
Law and Information Society 
May 2020 
The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku 
quality assurance system using the Turnitin Originality Check service. 
 
This thesis examines the copyrightability of machine-generated content in the United States and 
the European Union. For the purposes of this thesis, machine-generated content is content that 
has been created by an autonomous machine or an artificial intelligence algorithm. The amount 
of content created by autonomous machines has increased over the years, and today there are 
millions upon millions of works created solely by artificial intelligence systems. 
The thesis is divided into a total of nine chapters, outlining certain definitions, justifications for 
copyright protection, different stances and issues related to AI authorship, and the concept of 
originality. Most importantly, this thesis looks into the legal systems of the United States and the 
European Union, and attempts to determine whether AI-generated content could be eligible for 
copyright protection under those two legal systems. 
The chapter on the European Union focuses on both, the EU in-general and also on two current 
member states of the EU: Finland and the United Kingdom. Both subchapters outline the current 
legislation within the aforementioned countries, as well as some case law in relation to the topic 
of the thesis. Conversely, the chapter on the United States looks into the current copyright 
regime in the US, attempting to determine whether AI-generated content could receive copyright 
protection according to the current laws and case law of the United States. 
Keywords: 
Artificial intelligence, copyright law, intellectual property law, machine learning, EU law, US 
law 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this Master’s Thesis is to look into the relationship between artificial intelligence 
and copyright law from a comparative law perspective. More specifically, this thesis will 
compare and contrast the differences between the laws of the European Union and the United 
States of America in relation to works created by artificial intelligence algorithms, and whether 
AI-generated works are granted copyright protection within the respective jurisdictions examined 
in this Master’s Thesis. Furthermore, this thesis will examine the concepts of authorship and 
originality in regards to AI-generated works. In specific, this thesis attempts to find an answer to 
the question whether works created by artificial intelligence could be granted copyright 
protection. 
The reason as to why the author of this thesis has chosen this topic is due to the fact that artificial 
intelligence is a quickly growing phenomenon, and new technologies in relation to AI are 
constantly being developed. Copyright law and AI are also a tricky mixture due to issues relating 
to legal personhood, among other things. The question, “who owns the Copyright?” is constantly 
on the minds of jurists and engineers alike when discussing works generated via AI-algorithms. 
Should the owner of the copyright be the owner of the AI-software? Or could the rights be 
granted to the ones who actually programmed the software itself? Most importantly, is it even 
possible to grant Copyright protection to works created via AI-algorithms? The author of this 
thesis intends to look at all of these questions and more in their Master’s Thesis, and attempt to 
evaluate whether the answers to these questions are true or false, or perhaps something in 
between. 
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1.1. Background 
 
Artificial intelligence is currently a hot topic all over the world. While the concept of AI is 
nothing new, as the concept has been examined many times previously in science-fiction, the 
technology surrounding artificial intelligence has vastly improved in the past few decades.1 
Computers have become more efficient through the hard work of engineers and scientists alike. 
As such, humans have reached the ability to create functional AI solutions that are able to 
generate artistic works, such as books, paintings, and music, to name a few, with amazing 
precision and very little time and effort. At the time of this writing, thousands of works are being 
generated via AI-algorithms, many of which are undoubtedly very similar to each other in one 
way or another.2 While plagiarism is an issue in relation to AI-generated works, the focus of this 
thesis will mainly be on the protection of AI-generated works through copyright law. 
 
 
1.2. Research questions and limitations 
 
The main research question of this Master’s Thesis is whether machine-generated content could 
be eligible for copyright protection and, if so, who the owner of the rights to the work would be? 
As such, the author intends to look into different countries’ copyright legislation and legal 
precedents in relation to copyright law in order to evaluate how AI-generated works are 
protected within those countries, or whether AI-generated works are protected at all in their 
respective jurisdictions. Subsequently, the author intends to look into whether AI could be 
granted legal personhood in order to grant it authorship. Furthermore, the author of this thesis 
will look into the concept of originality in regards to AI-generated works. 
 
 
                                                 
1 “Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma” by Kalin Hristov, p. 450 
2 See “The Machine as Author” by Daniel Gervais 
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1.3. Research methods and sources 
 
The research method used in this Master’s Thesis will be a comparative one. The author intends 
to compare and contrast the laws of the European Union and the United States of America in 
relation to the problem introduced in the thesis. More specifically, the author intends to look into 
the laws of Finland and the United Kingdom, respectively, when evaluating whether AI-
generated works are given legal protection or not. In respect to the United States, the author 
intends to only look into the federal law in relation to their work due to the fact that US 
copyright law is mostly enacted on the federal level. However, the author will be looking into 
case law from the US in relation to this work. 
The reasons why the author has chosen the two aforementioned continents for their thesis are 
because, first of all, the United States is home to many technology firms, such as Amazon and 
Google, and, as such, the U.S. is among the countries on the forefront of technology. Second of 
all, the copyright laws of the United States differ enough from the laws in EU countries in order 
to be compared with each other efficiently. The reason why the author has choses Finland and 
the United Kingdom, specifically, is because Finland’s copyright law differs quite a bit from the 
UK’s copyright legislation due to the fact that both countries employ different legal systems 
within their jurisdictions. In spite of the fact that the UK is leaving the EU due to Brexit, the 
effect the UK has had on EU law and on other member states is still quite significant. 
 
1.4. Structure 
 
This Master’s Thesis is divided into a total of eight chapters. The first chapter serves as the 
introduction to this work, including the background to the topic, the research questions and 
limitations in relation to the work, the method of research and the sources used in the research, 
and this part, the general structure of the thesis. 
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The second chapter attempts to define the concept of artificial intelligence in the context of this 
thesis by examining the history and the definition of AI. In addition, the chapter will look into 
the differences of artificial intelligence and machine learning, and attempt to elaborate further the 
meanings of these aforementioned terms. 
The third chapter will focus on different justifications for copyright protection. Several 
arguments for and against the use of copyright will be looked at in detail in the chapter. 
Furthermore, certain limitations for copyright will be listed and detailed in the third chapter for 
the purposes of clarity. 
The fourth chapter will look at artificial intelligence in relation to authorship. The chapter will 
first outline the issues in relation to the concept of authorship in relation to the subject of the 
thesis, after which the concept of ownership will be examined in more detail in relation to 
copyright. The concept of ownership is an important part of the chapter as the chapter will 
attempt to find out who the owner of machine-generated works could be in regards to the 
legislations of different countries. The chapter will discuss the concept of originality, which is an 
equally important aspect of this thesis. The chapter will attempt to examine and define the 
concept of originality for the purpose of clarity. The concept of originality will be examined 
further in subsequent chapters. Furthermore, the chapter will discuss the concepts surrounding 
legal personhood and the idea / expression dichotomy. 
The fifth and sixth chapters will look at the situation within the European Union and the United 
States of America in relation to copyright law and works created through computer generation. 
The fourth chapter will outline European perspectives, whereas the fifth chapter will look at the 
stance of the United States in relation to the topic of this thesis. The views of several countries 
will be included, but the focus of the thesis will mainly be on Finland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. The chapter will also introduce several legal cases in relation to the topic from 
each of the aforementioned countries. 
The seventh chapter will be focused on examining the similarities and the differences of the 
countries and their respective legal systems that have been introduced in chapters four and five in 
relation to copyright law. The chapter will attempt to outline and analyze the similarities and 
differences in a thorough and concise manner by including all of the most important details in 
relation to the topic of this thesis. 
16 
 
The eighth and the ninth chapters will look at the future implications related to the topic of this 
thesis, and come up with a coherent conclusion regarding the subject and the research questions 
introduced and evaluated in this work. The eighth chapter will attempt to evaluate how the 
situation may develop in the future in relation to the protection of machine-generated content, 
and whether the content could perhaps ever be considered original enough to be warranted 
copyright protection. The ninth chapter will subsequently conclude the thesis. 
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2. DEFINING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
2.1. A brief history of Artificial Intelligence 
 
While the scientific term “artificial intelligence” (hereinafter referred to as “AI”) is relatively 
new, the concept of AI is a much older phenomenon. Some scholars have attributed the concept 
to the thinking of classical philosophers in ancient Greece. However, history has shown that even 
before the Greeks, the Chinese and the Egyptians have had similar ideas regarding AI, 
manifested in the construction of “automatons,” semi-autonomous devices that operated with 
very little human support.3 As such, it can be deduced that human beings have always had a 
peculiar fascination regarding man-made objects becoming living, sentient or, at the very least, 
self-operable. 
The fascination regarding artificial intelligence continued throughout centuries in the works of 
philosophers, scholars and writers. For instance, the 20th century classic known as the Wizard of 
Oz features the Tin man, a sentient robot that wishes to become more human by receiving a 
human heart.4 Another classic example, Metropolis, introduced a human-like robot that 
mimicked Maria, one of the main characters of the film. Similar works of fiction have been 
created by humans for a century thereafter. However, the concept of artificial intelligence ceased 
to be mere fiction during the Second World War as the British, with the exquisite help of the late 
and great Alan Turing, managed to decipher the Nazis’ coded messages by using the Bombe 
machine, a device that utilized artificial intelligence algorithms in order to decode secret 
messages.5 
The term “artificial intelligence” was coined at the Darthmouth Conference in 1956 by an 
American computer scientist named John McCarthy.6 The concept of AI itself soared greatly in 
                                                 
3 “A Brief History of Artificial Intelligence” by Tanya Lewis, available at: https://www.livescience.com/49007-
history-of-artificial-intelligence.html, accessed on 06.01.2020 
4 “The History of Artificial Intelligence” by Rockwell Anyoha, available at: 
http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/, accessed on 06.01.2020 
5 University of Washington, the History of Artificial Intelligence, p. 4, accessed on 06.01.2020 at 
https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06au/projects/history-ai.pdf 
6 Ibid., p. 4 
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the scientific community. New AI devices were created, each more magnificent than the 
previous one. One such device was the Ferranti Mark 1, a machine constructed in 1951 that 
could play checkers at a master level.7 Other, even more useful devices were built, throughout 
the next two decades. Some devices were designed to solve mathematical equations, others were 
designed to solve other types of problems. For example, the Japanese built the WABOT-1 in 
1972, which was considered “the first intelligent humanoid robot.”8 
The development of artificial intelligence came to a halt in 1975 due to the inefficiency of the 
computers at the time. It became virtually impossible to process the enormous amount of 
information required for AI-related algorithms. As such, governments and corporations became 
disinterested in the concept of AI and subsequently cut the funding for AI-related projects. This 
period, spanning from 1975 to 1995, was dubbed the “AI Winter.”9 The term itself came from 
the word “nuclear winter,” a theory according to which “mass use of nuclear weapons would blot 
out the sun with smoke and dust, causing plunging global temperatures, frozen Earth, and the 
extinction of humanity.”10 
In spite of the dramatic name for the period, the AI Winter was not exactly as terrifying for AI as 
the name may initially suggest. While AI-related projects may have lost their funding, many 
other projects that were closely related to artificial intelligence, were birthed and disguised under 
new names, including “Machine Learning,” and “Pattern recognition.” This allowed the projects 
to continue even during the time when the concept of AI had been nearly forgotten by 
governments and corporations, but not scientists.11 
Indeed, while governments and corporations may have lost faith in AI, many proponents of the 
concept remained within the science community, and they worked tirelessly in order to keep the 
concept of AI afloat. The proponents of AI finally caught their break when computers became 
more and more powerful during the 1990s. As the computers received more processing power, 
AI-related devices and projects became more sophisticated. As such, people became more and 
                                                 
7 Shaan Ray, History of AI, Towards Data Science, accessed on 06.01.2020 at 
https://towardsdatascience.com/history-of-ai-484a86fc16ef 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 University of Washington, the History of Artificial Intelligence, p. 17, accessed on 06.01.2020 at 
https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06au/projects/history-ai.pdf 
11 Ibid., p. 18 
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more interested in the concept and future of artificial intelligence. By the late 1990, AI had 
finally become a hot topic again. Garry Kasparov, the number one player of Chess was defeated 
by IBM’s Deep Blue, a machine that utilized machine learning in order to function.12 While the 
burst of the dotcom bubble halted some of the AI funding in the early 2000s, machine learning 
had already become such a prevalent concept that its development could no longer be stopped.13  
Today, the utilization of AI has become second nature for many companies, such as Amazon and 
Google, while building their services and processing their data, among many other uses.14 
However, AI is not only used by big companies anymore, and it’s definitely not only used for 
mere games of Chess or for collecting vast amounts of information about a specific topic any 
longer. AI is additionally being used for far more sophisticated matters today, such as detecting 
diseases15 and making music.16  
Furthermore, thanks to vast advancements in AI technology, artificial intelligence solutions have 
become more affordable for smaller companies.17 Therefore, it is not only the big businesses that 
get to benefit from the advancements of AI, but also the small companies that compete in the 
market with each other. The utilization of AI is an important tool in cutting costs of a business as 
the use of AI requires less manpower and is way more efficient than using real humans for 
conducting certain tasks, such as when dealing with large amounts of data or tagging products at 
a retail store.18 It can also be argued that when the cost of production becomes small, the cost of 
the product will subsequently become lower, which, in turn, is also beneficial for the consumer. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Shaan Ray, History of AI, Towards Data Science, accessed on 06.01.2020 at 
https://towardsdatascience.com/history-of-ai-484a86fc16ef 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 “DeepMind’s AI can detect over 50 eye diseases as accurately as a doctor” by James Vincent, available at: 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/13/17670156/deepmind-ai-eye-disease-doctor-moorfields, accessed on 
06.01.2020 
16 “How AI-Generated Music is Changing the Way hits are Made” by Dani Deahl, available at: 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/31/17777008/artificial-intelligence-taryn-southern-amper-music, accessed on 
06.01.2020 
17 “How is Artificial Intelligence Revolutionizing Small Businesses?” by Vipul Srivastav, available at: 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/341976, accessed on: 06.01.2020 
18 Ibid. 
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2.2. The Definition of Artificial Intelligence 
 
The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines artificial intelligence as follows: 
1. “A branch of computer science dealing with the simulation of intelligent behavior in 
computers. 
2. The capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior.”19 
The Encyclopedia Britannica defines artificial intelligence in a similar fashion: 
“Artificial intelligence (AI), the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to 
perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings.”20 
However, other definitions of artificial intelligence exist, as well. The choice of definition 
depends upon the main use intended for the program. There are currently two typical approaches 
and three different goals in relation to AI programs. These are known as “symbolic” and 
“connectionist approaches.” The goals are divided into what is known as “strong AI,” “applied 
AI,” and “cognitive simulation.” It must also be noted that there are other types of goals and 
approaches in existence, but the aforementioned goals and approaches are the ones that are most 
typically used in AI research.21 
The “symbolic” and the “connectionist” approaches are both methods applied in AI research. 
The “symbolic approach”, also known as the “top-down approach,” utilizes the processing of 
symbols in its functioning. The “connectionist approach,” also known as the “bottom-up 
approach” is a competing research method that utilizes artificial neural networks in order to 
imitate the brain’s structure.22 Both research methods have been followed for decades by 
scientists that focus on AI research. However, the “connectionist” method lost its support for a 
period of time from 1970 to 1980. In spite of the lack of popularity for the “connectionist” 
method in the 1970s, both methods are in wide use today. Both methods also have their own 
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problems. While the “symbolic approach” works best in closed simulations, the method breaks 
apart when applied to the real world. The “connectionist” method, however, fails to live up to its 
expectations due to the complexity of real neural networks, and is thus unable to keep up with 
the patterns in order to mimic the neurons of actual, living beings, no matter how simple their 
nervous systems are.23 
In addition to the aforementioned methods, there are also three major goals in existence in 
relation to AI research. These goals are “strong AI,” “applied AI,” and “cognitive simulation.”24 
The goal of “strong AI” is the most ambitious one of the three: to create a machine that can think 
independently and for themselves, without any human assistance. The underlying idea is to 
achieve a human-like robot that could even fool other humans into thinking that the machine was 
actually a human being, as well. Due to the ambitious nature of this goal, “strong AI” has not yet 
been achieved. While there has been some progress, “strong AI” is generally seen as a waste of 
time by scientists working on AI.25 
The next two goals are less ambitious than the previous one, but they have at least come into 
fruition. “Applied AI,” for instance, has been utilized successfully in the fields of health care and 
finance, as there have been systems created that are able to diagnose diseases and help with 
stock-trading.26 “Cognitive simulation,” on the other hand, has been used in neuroscience and 
cognitive psychology. In this regard, the system is used in testing how the human mind works.27 
This thesis is looking at the relationship of artificial intelligence and copyright law in an attempt 
to determine whether works created by AI algorithms could be granted copyright protection. The 
thesis evaluates this question from the points of view of authorship and originality. In that sense, 
the question here is whether AI could be given legal personhood, and whether the AI could be 
considered as the original author of the work, or whether the original author was actually the 
person that programmed the AI algorithm. Due to the fact that “weak AI” relies on human factor 
in creation of content, “weak AI” will not be examined further in this thesis. Also, while 
“cognitive simulation” has shown great success in exploring the human mind, the methods 
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applied and the uses of the system are not in any relation to the topic of this thesis. As such, 
“cognitive simulation” will not be considered further in this thesis. Instead, for the purposes of 
this thesis, only strong AI will be examined in more detail due to its nature of being as 
independent as possible. 
Indeed, while “strong AI” is thought by some to be nearly impossible to be achieved in the near 
future, it is also the most relevant system available in relation to the topic of this thesis. 
Furthermore, while “strong AI” is considered to be independent and able to think for itself, some 
people like Noam Chomsky and Claude Shannon have suggested that the notion of “thinking” 
may vary by person to person and is therefore subjective. What exactly constitutes as “thinking?” 
Indeed, Chomsky has argued that the word “think” should not even be associated with machines 
due to the fact that doing so would be “arbitrary and pointless.”28 
One of the biggest problems of determining whether AI could be intelligent is that there is 
currently no viable way to determine the intelligence of artificial intelligence. While some 
scholars have proposed the Turing test to be used in determining the intelligence of an AI 
system, scholars like Claude Shannon and John McCarthy have pointed out that it could, in 
theory, be possible to program a machine to answer the questions of the interviewer plausibly by 
providing the program with all the possible answers and having it choose the most plausible 
answer out of all the available answers to each question. Doing so would certainly fool the 
interviewer, but it would by no means mean that the machine itself was intelligent.29 
Due to the fact that even the most sophisticated AI systems have been criticized as not being 
truly intelligent, it is nearly impossible to satisfy the critics. No objective criterion exists for 
determining the intelligence of a machine. Marvin Minsky has come up with their own solution 
to the current problem regarding AI and intelligence: intelligence should merely be considered as 
an indicator of solving problems that are yet not understood by us.30 Indeed, the author of this 
thesis is inclined to agree with Minsky’s notion. “Strong AI” exists for as long as we can accept 
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the fact that the system comes with its own limitations. While sentient AI may not yet be 
possible, AI systems have become ever more sophisticated with the help of machine learning. 
 
2.3. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
 
Although sometimes used analogously, the terms Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
are not synonyms. Instead, machine learning is a subset of artificial intelligence.31 Guadamuz 
notes that the concept of artificial intelligence is most typically associated with science-fiction.32 
While AI has, indeed, been utilized in many books and movies over the past decades and even 
centuries, the real life applications of AI are considerably different. Similarly, the concept of 
machine learning is quite different to that which it is attributed to in certain fictitious works.33 
However, machine learning may not be that far-off its fictitious counterparts. As the name 
suggests, machine learning is the concept of algorithms being able to self-learn information 
relevant to their programming.34 Due to this very fact, machine learning has been described as 
being more dynamic and more flexible than other concepts of artificial intelligence, thus 
meaning that machine learning requires less human input than various other methods involved in 
autonomous content-creation.35 
The fact that machine learning requires less human input in the creation of content is quite a big 
deal in relation to copyright protection. The threshold of originality, a concept discussed in 
further chapters of this thesis, typically demands the work to be original in order to receive 
copyright protection. Because programs utilizing machine learning are typically capable of such 
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originality, the granting of copyright to content generated or created by machine learning 
algorithms may be possible.36 
Machine learning utilizes artificial neural networks in order to function properly. These networks 
are akin to those found in humans and other living organism on the planet. The functioning is 
rather similar. However, as has been noted previously, the complex nature of these neural 
networks makes the work rather difficult.37 
However, in spite the difficult nature of the work, some successes have been recorded in relation 
to artificial neural networks. Guadamuz points out the Google project, dubbed “Deep Dream,” in 
which neural networks are utilized in the creation of “unique, bizarre and unsettling” images.38 
Explaining the technical details further, Deep Dream renders an already existing image 
mathematically by the use of machine learning and by mimicking biological neural networks. As 
such, the computer imitates human thought and determines how the image should be created.39 
“Instead of exactly prescribing which feature we want the network to amplify, we can also let the 
network make that decision. In this case we simply feed the network an arbitrary image or photo 
and let the network analyze the picture. We then pick a layer and ask the network to enhance 
whatever it detected. Each layer of the network deals with features at a different level of 
abstraction, so the complexity of features we generate depends on which layer we choose to 
enhance.”40 
 
The above is a quote of the researches explaining how artificial neural networks are utilized in 
Google’s Deep Dream project. Because the program is self-learning and able to create content 
without human input, one could argue that machine learning could very well be the future of AI-
generated content, just like Guadamuz has predicted.41 
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However, the notion that machine learning is “self-learning” may be misleading. Pathmind 
explains that the “learning” part actually means that the algorithms utilized by machine learning 
programs try to make optimizations in accordance with certain dimensions. For instance, the 
algorithms may attempt to minimize error or maximize the chances of their predictions being 
true. This basically means that machine learning systems continue on guessing the right answer 
in relation to the function of the system itself.42 By these standards, machine learning systems 
may actually be quite far away from being able to create original works without human 
interaction. Nevertheless, machine learning is an interesting and constantly developing concept 
that has been utilized in various different projects to this day.43 
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3. JUSTIFICATION OF COPYRIGHT 
 
Copyright law provides protection to works of audiovisual and other nature.44 But what are the 
reasons behind copyright protection? This chapter will look into the most common reasons and 
justifications for and against copyright protection. The chapter will additionally outline certain 
limitations for copyright law. 
 
3.1. Arguments for Copyright Protection 
 
Several arguments exist for copyright protection. These include, among many others, the 
protection of value, marketplace competition, aesthetic merit, and the use of humans as proxy 
authors.45 The aforementioned arguments have been brought forward by Daniel Gervais, a 
professor who has studied the justification of copyright rather extensively. 
The argument regarding the protection of value is quite straightforward and simple: the idea is 
that, because creations are of some value to someone, the creations should be protected by 
copyright. Gervais argues that the reasoning behind the argument is flawed due to the fact that 
the law must not, and simply does not, always protect things of value.46 However, other authors, 
such as Kalin Hristov, have argued that financial incentives are important for authors.47 
The second argument for copyright protection is that regarding marketplace competition. 
According to this view, machine-generated content should be granted copyright protection in 
order to avoid any discrepancies in the marketplace between human-created and machine-
generated works. In other words, if machine-generated content would not receive copyright 
protection, they would become free of charge, at least according to the argument. The free nature 
of works, coupled with the fact that AI is able to generate a vast amount of content in a relatively 
short time period, could be rather devastating for the market of copyrighted content. Works that 
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were for sale would likely not be able to compete with works that were given out for free. 
Because of that, machine-generated content should be granted copyright protection in order to 
also protect human-created content.48 However, one important problem emerges: who would 
receive the copyright to the work created by a machine? Would it be the owner of the software 
that created the work? Or would it be the software itself that received the copyright? The concept 
of authorship has been vastly debated in the past by legal scholars, such as Jane Ginsburg, Daniel 
Gervais, Andrés Guadamuz, and Kalin Hristov, to name a few… authorship is also an important 
aspect of this thesis, and it will be looked at in more detail in the next chapter. 
The role of aesthetic merit has been considered as an argument for copyright protection. The idea 
behind the argument is that machine-generated content should be protected due to the fact that 
the quality or merit are not factors in determining the eligibility for copyright.49 Gervais does not 
quite agree with the notion by stating that the principle behind the idea is utilized incorrectly. 
Gervais reasons that aesthetic merit has no merit in regards to the problem. The only thing that 
matters is whether authorship and originality exists. He goes on to explain that human authorship 
is a requirement for originality.50 
The last argument that will be examined here for copyright protection is that of humans as proxy 
authors. According to this argument, human owners of AI systems are also owners of the works 
the systems produce. If an AI creates a song, for example, the human that owns the AI becomes 
the owner of the song created by the AI.51 However, Gervais argues that because AI can make 
choices that are arguably too unforeseen by human actors, human beings cannot be considered as 
proxy authors of AI-generated content.52 
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3.2. Arguments against Copyright Protection 
 
Several arguments exist against copyright protection. These include the humanness of 
authorship, the responsibilities that come with the rights granted, originality, and derivative 
works.53 The arguments are further divided into further sections that will be looked at 
individually in the next following paragraphs. 
According to Gervais, the humanness of authorship consists of the early figure of the author, the 
Statute of Anne and the early American law, the author’s rights as human rights, and the 
evolution of author’s rights in the U.S.54 In the first part, Gervais writes about the early origins of 
an author, where the individual author emerged from and how it came to be. 55 The second part 
goes further into history and speaks of the relationship between the Statute of Anne and 
authorship.56 In short, Gervais argues that human authorship has always been at the heart of 
copyright law by drawing examples from Lockean justifications for copyright and the individual 
nature of the authors at the time.57  
In the third part, the part concerning author’s rights as human rights, Gervais introduces the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as “UDHR”) and notes that it:  
“Protects the moral and material interests of authors resulting from and scientific, literary or 
artistic production.”58 
 
By using the UDHR as an example, Gervais is basically stating that only humans can have 
human rights. Machines are therefore exempted from having such rights. However, Gervais does 
not expressly state that machines could not be considered authors or have copyright protection, at 
this point.59 
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Gervais uses the evolution of the author’s rights in the United States as one of his argument 
against copyright protection.60 In this part, Gervais introduces various different people, such as 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, in order to explain his argument. Once more, the human 
author is at the center of the matter. While some scholars have argued that nothing is genuinely 
creative or innovative anymore due to the fact that almost everything that can be done has 
already been done by somebody before, Gervais does not agree with the notion that the “death of 
the author” would justify machine-generated content to be copyrightable.61 
Gervais brings up originality as one of his arguments against copyright protection. According to 
his views, machines cannot be original enough as they rely on predetermined choices and data in 
order to function and to generate content.62 In relation to originality, Gervais mentions the works 
made for hire doctrine. The idea, in this case, would be to grant a legal person the rights to the 
work created. For instance, if an AI created a painting, the rights would go to the legal entity, 
perhaps the AI itself.63 However, Gervais also mentions that the doctrine is not really used for 
the aforementioned scenario. Instead, the work is often created by a human and the rights go to 
the corporate entity that the human author works for.64 
Lastly, the concept of derivative works is brought up as an argument against copyright 
protection. Gervais goes on to explain what types of works are derivative and what are not, and 
comes to the conclusion that AI-generated content is not derivative in nature due to the fact that 
AI “finds correlations and patterns to use as a matrix for its own production.”65 Furthermore, 
Gervais is also of the opinion that, because machines are not capable of creating works that 
would be original enough, and because originality is required for a derivative work to be 
copyrightable, machine-generated content is not regarded as derivative works.66 
One more thing that has been used as an argument against copyright protection is that in relation 
to the freedom of speech. Opponents of copyright have argued that copyright infringes upon the 
freedom of speech as it may limit creativity. However, proponents of copyright law have 
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contended that, because the threshold for creativity is high enough, and because copyright law 
does not extend to information but rather the creation as a whole, copyright protection does not 
violate the freedom of speech.67 
 
3.3. Limitations for Copyright Protection 
 
Copyright law has quite a few exceptions and limitations. These exceptions and limitations have 
been put in place for societal, cultural, and educational reasons.68 The access to information and 
the freedom of speech are among the reasons for limiting copyright protection of creations.69 
Copyright does not extend to ideas, information or processes.70 These exceptions and limitations 
have no bearing on whether the work in question was valuable or not. The amount of time 
invested on the creation of the work in question does not matter, either.71 
When it comes to copyright law, exceptions and limitations are by no means synonymous. These 
two terms mean different things in the context of copyright law. Exceptions allow persons to 
commit the permitted act in question without imposing any payments on that person. Limitations 
allow the use, but they also require payment. The payment is typically determined by 
compulsory licensing systems set up by government authorities.72 
Some of the most typical exceptions and limitations include the right of fair quotation, the ability 
to make copies of works for the purposes of study and research, the making of parody or satire, 
the use of copyrighted material in news reports, the exhaustion of rights, and so on.73 It should, 
however, be noted that different countries allow different exceptions and limitations in their 
national copyright laws.74 
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The right of fair quotation is among one of the most fundamental limitations of copyright 
protection. According to this limitation, a person has the ability to use copyright protected 
material in an entire new context, as part of a new work or creation. This practice is most 
commonly known as quotation of work. There are several different ways of making quotations. 
For instance, one may take an exact excerpt from the original work and use it in their own work. 
One could also refer to the original work in their own work by discussing the original work or 
one of its parts in the new work in question. However, one may not use a quotation in order to 
distort or change the original meaning of the original work.75 
The right of fair quotation serves the interests of the public. For example, in the making of 
research papers, it would be practically impossible to request a permit from the original creator 
of a study paper in order to quote a part of the work or refer to the work’s scientific results. 
Another justification for the right of quotation is the ability to use already existing material as 
part of new material or research, and communicate the details of the original material to the 
public. If such a practice was forbidden, the results of a minor, yet important, study would likely 
never receive any wider audience. Furthermore, it is important to question and criticize the 
results of scientific studies for the furtherance of science.76 
The ability to make copies of works typically allows for making copies for private use and 
educational purposes.77 International copyright treaties have come up with the requirement of 
satisfying the “3-step test” of the Berne Convention when creating exceptions and limitations in 
regards to the reproduction right. Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty states the following: 
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of 
such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the author.”78 
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The United States exemption for retransmissions of public performances of radio and television 
broadcasts in different venues was contested in the WTO. A dispute resolution panel was set up, 
and it was eventually decided in regards to the matter that national legislatures must ensure the 
following: 
“(1) That the exemption is limited to a narrow and specifically defined class of uses [“certain 
special cases”];   
(2) That the exempted use does not compete with an actual or potential source of economic gain 
from the ways rightholders normally exercise rights under copyright [“conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work”]; and    
(3) That the exempted use does not unreasonably harm rightholder interests that are justifiable 
in light of general copyright objectives [“not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the rightholder”]; the unreasonableness of the harm may be allayed if the member state imposes 
a compensation-ensuring compulsory license in lieu of an outright exemption.”79 
 
The WTO Panel requires that all steps in the process are satisfied individually. In other words, in 
order to receive an exemption in regards to the matter, all of the above steps must be true. 
Otherwise, no exemption shall be provided. Understandably, the Panel’s requirement of 
satisfying all of the three steps has received some criticism. “European Copyright Code” by the 
Wittem Project leaves the first step completely out: 
“Any other use that is comparable to the uses enumerated in article 5.1 to 5.4(1) [Uses with 
minimal economic significance; Uses for the purpose of freedom of expression and information; 
Uses Permitted to Promote Social, Political and Cultural Objectives; Uses for the purpose of 
enhancing competition (advertising and reverse engineering)] is permitted provided that the 
corresponding requirements of the relevant limitation are met and the use does not conflict with 
the normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the author or rightholder, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”80 
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The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (hereinafter referred to as 
“WCT”) is yet another international copyright treaty that has attempted to harmonize copyright 
law between different countries. Article 11 of the WCT comes up with its own limitation by 
requiring protection for technological measures that: 
“Are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.”81 
As such, a technological measure that hinders legal use may be circumvented. However, there is 
a problem with the law in question. The technological measure could also hinder unlawful uses. 
In those cases, it is possible that the measure may not be able to distinguish between users 
making lawful or unlawful uses.82 
Both, the United States and the European Union, have come up with different solutions to the 
aforementioned problem. The US Copyright Office utilizes triennial rulemaking, which provides 
an approach to accommodate copyright exceptions. The EU Information Society Directive 
provides another way of dealing with the issue: the Directive requires EU member states to take 
appropriate measures to ensure that rightholders provide the beneficiary with the means to 
benefit from that exception or limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that exception or 
limitation, in accordance with certain exceptions and limitations listed in the Directive. 
Furthermore, the beneficiary should also have legal access to the protected work or subject-
matter concerned.83 
As has been demonstrated above, the US and the EU systems differ quite a bit from each other. 
The US system utilizes an approach where the burden is placed on the beneficiaries claiming 
exemption in order to establish its necessity. Conversely, the EU system relies on the 
rightholders in order to ensure that lawful uses continue to be available.84 
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4. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AS AN AUTHOR 
 
Millions of works of audiovisual nature have been created in the past years by artificial 
intelligence algorithms. These works include literature, music, paintings, and even newspaper 
articles.85 However, important questions emerge: who is to be considered as the author of AI-
generated works? Who or what entity is to be given the rights to works created by AI? Or should 
copyright protection be completely excluded from AI-generated content? This chapter of the 
thesis will discuss the relationship between artificial intelligence and authorship, and what the 
implications may be for granting authorship to AI. This chapter will further evaluate the concept 
of originality in relation to AI authorship and copyright. 
 
4.1. Issues relating to Authorship 
 
The relationship between artificial intelligence and authorship is a tricky one. Considering the AI 
as an author comes with several issues, especially when copyright law is thrown into the mix. 
For instance, the lack of financial or other type of incentives (e.g. happiness) is always present in 
AI, unless if the aforementioned incentives were programmed into the machine. Nevertheless, 
machines will create content solely based on their programming. They do not truly care for 
money or making other people or themselves happy. As a matter of fact, they do not care about 
anything that humans would care for. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 
which is also known as the Intellectual Property Clause, grants the following to the Congress: 
“To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”86 
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In that sense, it could be construed that the idea of monetization has been included in the U.S. 
Constitution due to the fact that creative works are to be protected under it. If authors had no 
need to monetize their works, the works would likely not need any protection, either.87 
Another issue in relation to AI authorship is that of originality. For example, in order to create a 
software that produced visual works, such as images, one could input thousands upon thousands 
of pictures into the program and have it evaluate the pictures. After that, the program could be 
commanded to create similar pictures based upon the ones inputted into the programming of the 
machine, but avoid creating the exact same type of pictures as included in the program. 
Potentially hundreds of thousands of images could be created, some of which would likely be 
very similar to the pictures that had been included in the program, but different just enough to 
warrant originality of the content.88 
The third issue examined in this thesis is that of copyright duration. The duration of copyright is 
typically long, usually lasting for the author’s age and more. In some countries, copyright 
protection will span over a century after the author’s demise.89 In this regard, Kalin Hristov has 
pointed out that AI is technically perpetual in nature. In that sense, if the modern rules of 
copyright law were applied to AI-generated content, the copyright protection of AI-generated 
works would effectively never cease, and the works created by AI software would practically 
retain their copyright protection forever.90 
The fourth issue in relation to AI authorship has to do with the fact that AI is technically able to 
create vast amounts of content in a very short time period, without any physical restrictions that 
are known to humans, apart from perhaps lack of electricity. Because of that, machines are able 
to generate content tirelessly and effortlessly, without having to eat, sleep or take any breaks 
whatsoever. Also, due to the fact that computers are so sophisticated today, and constantly 
improving, the time it takes to create masterpieces worthy of Beethoven’s symphonies or 
Rembrandt’s paintings is minimal.91 
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In addition to Hristov, several other scholars have written about the issues regarding authorship 
in relation to AI-generated content. These include Daniel Gervais, Jane Ginsburg, Pamela 
Samuelson, and Timothy Butler, to name a few. 
In relation to the first issue, Gervais has come up with several compelling counter-arguments. 
The first issue entails that works that have some value to somebody should be protected by 
copyright. However, Gervais argues that the reasoning provided is erroneous in nature. That is 
because, according to Gervais, the reasoning is: 
“Based on a vague restitutionary (or “reap/sow”) impulse that some value was 
misappropriated.”92 
Gervais makes the notion that free riding is not against the law. He also explains that the law 
does not have to protect everything that may or may not have value. Arguably, there are some 
good examples of why free riding should be allowed in relation to copyright law. For instance, 
some countries have made exceptions to copyright law in regards to parodies and satires. These 
can sometimes prove to be quite fruitful works, and great additions to the public domain.93 
The issue in relation to originality is one of the central issues in regards to this thesis. The 
concept of originality is important in determining whether a creation could be granted copyright 
protection. While the threshold of originality varies from country to country, the concept itself is 
typically known all over the world.94 Several scholars have examined the concept of originality 
in relation to machine-generated content and their ability to be protected by copyright. While the 
concept itself is examined in subsequent chapters of this thesis, this part will focus on the 
concept of originality in relation to the authorship of content created by autonomous machines, 
or artificial intelligence algorithms and machine learning. 
The issue regarding originality is in many ways similar to the fourth issue that has been 
examined above. The fourth issue supposes that AI could create vast amounts of works with very 
little effort. If all of those works were deemed to be original and creative, and if those works 
were granted copyright protection, it could lead to a situation where the amount of works 
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available to be created would be exhausted by autonomous content creators. However, the 
aforementioned is only true if content created by AI were to be deemed original enough to 
warrant copyright protection to it.  
Alen-Savikko has pointed out that, while there are quite a few differences in the different legal 
systems, especially between Europe and the United States, in relation to copyright law and the 
concept of originality, the differences are rather mild. However, because these two 
aforementioned continents protect different things with their copyright, with the EU placing the 
protection on the author and the US placing the protection on the work itself, there could be 
some drastic differences in relation to content created by autonomous machines, and the 
protection of that content, between the two continents.95 These differences will be looked at in 
more detail in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
The duration of copyright is an important factor in relation to content generated by autonomous 
robots. The fact that robots are technically perpetual in nature could pose some challenges to 
determining the proper duration for content generated by AI algorithms, provided that machine-
generated works could even be granted copyright protection in the first place. The duration of 
copyright in different countries will be examined in more detail in the forthcoming chapters, but 
the concept of copyright duration in relation to authorship is examined here. 
As Hristov has pointed out, human beings are more limited than machines in the sense that 
humans typically have shorter lifespans. The duration of copyright is already quite high, with the 
Berne Convention setting the duration at 50 years after the original author’s death. Some 
countries have also increased their copyright durations.96 As autonomous machines do not age in 
the same way that humans do, and because autonomous machines cannot really pass away in the 
same way that humans do, AI machines are technically undying. This factor proposes a challenge 
for the way we currently understand copyright duration.97 
Hristov has come up with a solution to the problem in relation to copyright duration in regards to 
content created by autonomous machines. He proposes that the employee-employer relationship 
in the made for hire doctrine were reinterpreted in order to account for AI-generated content. In 
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other words, the ownership of the work should be transferred from the machine to its employer.98 
Doing so would effectively remove the death requirement from the ceasing of copyright 
protection, as the duration for works made for hire is different from the standard duration of 
copyright. In the former case, the duration is determined by the date of publication and the date 
of creation of the work itself, rather than the lifespan of the author.99 
 
4.2. Who owns the Copyright? 
 
The question as to whether artificial intelligence, a non-living entity with human-like, artificially 
created intelligence, could retain the rights to works created by it, is a rather peculiar question in 
and of itself. While copyright holders do not always have to be natural persons, there are plenty 
of other things that should be considered in regards to the question. For instance, jurisdiction 
plays an important role regarding copyright law. While some jurisdictions, such as the United 
Kingdom, allow companies to own copyright (known as corporate authorship)100, some other 
places may not have such provisions in their copyright law.101 Furthermore, the duration of the 
copyright is of equal importance.  
While works protected under corporate authorship may in some countries receive shorter 
copyright durations, countries with more ambiguous stances on copyright issues may not 
differentiate between copyrights owned by natural and legal persons. Also, in some countries, 
works created under corporate authorship may actually receive longer copyright durations. For 
instance, in the United States, the term of copyright is the life of the author plus 70 years. 
However, if the author is set to be a legal person (e.g. a company), the copyright duration will be 
95 years. As such, choosing the most favorable option for the copyright may actually depend on 
the age and well-being of the original author of the work.102 
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Approaching the question as to whether AI could own the rights to copyrighted material from the 
point of view of corporate authorship may not actually be the most sophisticated method. Not 
only because corporate authorship is not recognized in all countries, but also because, even if the 
country in question recognized corporate authorship and granted copyright to legal persons, the 
country may still not grant copyright to content generated by machines. This is especially true in 
the case of the United States, where U.S. Copyright Office has published a “Compendium of 
Best Practices,” according to which “the office will not register works produced by a machine or 
mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or 
intervention from a human author.”103 Instead, works created with no direct human intervention 
end up into the public domain by default in the United States.104 However, the statement holds 
that works created with creative input and human intervention are granted copyright protection. 
Perhaps the fact that human beings are typically the programmers of artificial intelligence 
systems could constitute “human intervention?” At this point in time, however, the current case 
law shows that this is not the case in the United States.105 
Regardless of whether the U.S. Copyright Office allowed machine-generated content to be 
copyrightable, we are still not sure whether the copyright would actually be granted to the 
machine itself or the owner of the machine. Kalin Hristov argued in his book “Artificial 
Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma” that if the U.S. Copyright Office continued with their 
current stance of not granting copyright to machine-generated works, the scientists and 
programmers working on AI would become disincentivized and thus not have enough motivation 
to work on AI-related projects.106 However, in spite of Hristov’s statements, the use of AI has 
risen dramatically over the past few years. The global AI industry revenue is expected to hit as 
high as 97.9 billion USD by 2023.107 In that sense, in spite of the fact that AI is not directly 
granted copyright in certain countries, the use of AI is still very relevant to businesses in helping 
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them grow and cutting their costs. Indeed, in a 2019 survey, 29.5% of small and medium-sized 
business owners had spoken in favor of using various AI-related technologies.108 
When it comes to copyright ownership in relation to machine-generated content, there are several 
options available in regards to who the owner of the content could be. These options include the 
programmer of the machine, the user, the owner of the machine, the machine itself, joint 
authorship, a fictional human author, and lastly, nobody. These options will be looked at in more 
detail below in order to determine who could best own AI-generated content. 
Programmers of the machine are the persons that have created the autonomous machine in 
question. One of the main reasons as to why programmers should be considered as owners of 
machine-generated content is because the programmers are essentially the persons who created 
the machine itself. Without the direct input of the programmer, the machine itself could not have 
been created. In addition, creating autonomous machines that are capable of producing their own 
content is a very demanding task, both intellectually and time-wise. In that sense, it would be fair 
to provide the programmer with some reward for their work.109 
Furthermore, when it comes to the relationship between the programmer and the machine, AI 
machines typically follow the commands of the programmer. This is another argument in support 
of the programmer being the owner of the content generated by an autonomous machine. While 
the end-user may provide commands to the machine in order to create content, the programmer 
actually made this possible. The end-user relies on the programming of the machine, as does the 
machine itself. Also, while the programmer may allow their programs to be used for non-
commercial purposes, in the event that the end-user tried to make money out of the program or 
its creations, the programmer may have some objections to the end-user’s monetization 
attempts.110 
However, there are also several counter-arguments to granting the ownership of machine-
generated content to the programmer. The first counter-argument is that the programmer has a 
choice in regards to publishing and distributing their program. The programmer can leave the 
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program unpublished and generate content with it by him or herself, and thereafter obtain 
copyright to the works generated by the program. By doing so, the programmer would not be 
able to monetize on the program itself, but they could potentially make money out of the content 
generated by the machine.111 
Furthermore, if the programmer is distributing their program for a fee, it is only fair that the end-
user would be able to benefit from the content generated by the program, too. After all, 
generating content is the prime purpose of the program in question. If the end-user was not able 
to monetize on the content generated by the machine, there would be little to no point in 
purchasing the program itself.112 
Perhaps one of the most compelling counter-arguments for granting the ownership to the 
programmer is that, if the programmer was granted the rights to all works generated by their 
program, the programmer would be over-rewarded. Although the programmer may have 
programmed the machine in question, the programmer is not likely able to predict all the content 
the machine could generate. Furthermore, it would likely be difficult to enforce the 
programmer’s rights due to the fact that the end-users may not always be willing to inform which 
content was generated by the particular programmer’s machine. Distinguishing machine-
generated content from human-created content could prove rather difficult.113 
The user of the machine is another candidate for the ownership of machine-generated content. 
The user is the person who utilizes the machine in question and commands it to make a new 
creation, perhaps based on previously created material, such as images. However, in cases where 
the user’s input is minimal, it may be more difficult to attribute authorship of the work to the 
user.114 
There are some reasons as to why users could be granted ownership to machine-generated 
content. The first reason is that the user is considered as the instrument of fixation for the work 
in question. In other words, the user is the person who caused the work to be created. If it were 
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not for the user’s input, the work in question would also not exist. The person who has “fixed” 
the work is most typically considered as the author of the work, at least in the United States.115 
Another reason that supports the user being the owner of the content is that the threshold of 
originality is typically quite low. Samuelson explains that a person who records a live musical 
performance is considered as the author of the recording, in spite of the fact that the person 
recording the performance had nothing to do with the actual performance. All it takes is a click 
of a button to “generate” the content.116 Similarly, a person inputting images to a computer 
software and having that software generate a completely new image based on the images 
inputted into the program could grant authorship to the person.117 
Assuming that the user would have purchased a license to the program that generates content 
autonomously, it would make sense to allow that user to monetize on the content generated by 
the machine. One would also assume that the person who purchased the program would also 
want to generate content that they could sell, in return for their investment into the product.118 
Additionally, in some cases, the user may have to do more than just press a button or issue a 
simple command to the machine in order for it to generate new and original content. The content 
may also become quite valuable.119 
There are some counter-arguments to granting the rights of the work to the user. Hristov has 
opined that users do not generally contribute to the initial development of AI. He has made the 
argument that granting ownership to users instead of the programmers could have some negative 
consequences to the development of artificial intelligence and machine learning projects. For 
instance, if users were granted copyright ownership to the content generated by programs, the 
programmer or the owner of the program could limit the use of AI by third parties. This would 
allow the programmers to retain their copyright to the works created by their algorithms. 
However, it would also hinder the development of AI. This could, in turn, lead to a decline in AI-
generated works.120 
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The owner of the machine could also serve as a potential candidate for the owner of machine-
generated content. This idea is based on the view that the owner is the owner of a company, for 
instance, and the company would utilize the machine in its operations. In that sense, the content 
generated by the machine would be considered as works made for hire. The made for hire 
doctrine is as follows: 
“(If) a work is made for hire, an employer is considered the author even if an employee actually 
created the work. The employer can be a firm, an organization, or an individual.”121 
Hristov has proposed to redefine the work made for hire doctrine in order to better suit the needs 
of AI-generated content protection. He suggests that the terms “employer” and “employee” were 
interpreted a little differently to also mean autonomous robots, and not just living beings. Hristov 
explains that an “employer” could be regarded as a person that renders the services of another 
entity in order to accomplish its goal. The owner of the machine in question would be considered 
as the employer in this case as they utilize the machine in order to generate new content. Hristov 
further reasons that by reinterpreting the doctrine in order to take AI-generated content into 
account, the current issue of machine-generated content going directly into the public domain 
would be solved.122 
The machine itself could also be considered as the owner of the content it produces. Several 
scholars have been in favor of the idea of allowing machines to own their own creations by 
allowing non-humans to be considered as authors. For example, Ryan Abbott has opined that 
non-human authors should be granted legal rights in order to promote the development of 
artificial intelligence.123 
In a similar fashion, Andrew Wu has expressed his views regarding AI authorship. He uses a 
fictional character named “Data” from a science-fiction television series called “Star Trek: The 
Next Generation.” The character is a humanoid robot that is capable of producing his own 
artwork and other such content, completely independently. Wu makes the following arguments 
about granting AI authorship: 
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First, the programmer of the artificial intelligence software fails to comply with the fixation 
requirement due to the fact that the Data’s art work is not repeatable or predictable. Second, the 
Data produces its own content independently, without any human interaction. Third, as the user 
is missing, joint ownership is not applicable. Fourth, the requirements of section 102 are met by 
works that have been generated by Data. These include works like sculptures and paintings that 
would meet the requirements of fixation and originality for Data in the same fashion as they 
would meet these for human authors. Fifth, the artificial intelligence software is capable of 
determining whether to produce subsequent works or not. As such, the Copyright Office or 
courts should provide copyright protection to the content generated by the AI. This would, in 
turn, encourage and motivate the AI to create works of art in the future, as well. 124 
As such, Abbott and Wu seem to share the notion that allowing autonomous machines to have 
ownership over the content created by them would benefit the future of AI-generated content. 
However, the idea that machines were granted rights over their works has sparked a lot of 
criticism and controversy among scholars. Hristov has stated that granting AI authorship rights 
could lead to uncertain legal challenges and even systemic abuse. First of all, non-humans are 
not natural persons and are thus not considered to be legally responsible for their actions. Second 
of all, Hristov argues that if authorship was redefined to include non-humans as authors, the legal 
system would be undermined. This could, in turn, lead to further uncertainty.125 
Joint authorship is yet another interesting solution to the current problem of who should be 
considered as the author and owner of the works generated by autonomous machines. In this 
scenario, both the user and the programmer would be considered as joint authors of the works 
created by AI systems.126 However, as Samuelson points out, the current legal system would not 
likely allow for the joint authorship of users and programmers in the case of autonomous content 
creation, at least in the United States. This is because a “joint work” is defined as follows: 
“A work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged 
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”127 
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Due to the above definition, when it comes to computer-generated content, it could be rather 
difficult to establish a joint intent between the programmer and the user due to possible vast 
distances between the two, for instance.128 Furthermore, joint authorship does not consolidate 
ownership rights. It actually fractionates them between the owners. In that sense, if there are 
multiple programmers and users involved in the programming and using the software in 
question, all of the individuals have to be taken into consideration for ownership rights.129 In 
addition, in a typical joint work, the persons working on the project are typically in close contact 
with each other as they collaborate on their project. However, in the case of computer-generated 
content, it is highly likely that the programmer and the user will never even meet each other. The 
programmer writes the program, which is later sold to the user, and the user thereafter utilizes the 
program to generate content from it.130 
Wu has been a little more optimistic about considering the user and the programmer as joint 
authors. He uses a virtual reality program where the user’s utilization of a magic wand produces 
a “musical sculpture.” Wu’s explanation regarding the concept is outlined below. 
First, several features of the program’s output are predictable and repeatable. These include 
certain music tones and the appearance of the trail of bubbles in the visual display of Wu’s 
example program. Second, the user has choice over the individual notes and bubbles made with 
the wand. These would meet the requirements of minimal creativity. Third, both the user and the 
programmer consider their contributions to the work as parts of a unitary whole. As such, they 
have a clear intention of being joint authors. 131 
As per Wu’s hypothesis, the user and the programmer actually do collaborate with each other on 
the project that they work on. Both parties have a part in the creation generated by the 
program.132 
Fictional human author is another hypothetical candidate for the owner of machine-generated 
content. The fictional human author theory was originally proposed by Timothy L. Butler. 
According to Butler, in the case of machine-generated content, the courts should assume that the 
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content was created by a fictional human author and thus provide the appropriate rights 
associated with the creation of the work to the owner of the AI software copyrights, the problem-
specifier or the computer owner, either individually, jointly or in part.133 
Butler argues that his proposal has several advantages. First of all, the court deciding over the 
case does not have to distinguish between a human author and a non-human author, because the 
existence of a human author is presumed. Second of all, because the author is considered to be a 
human being in a legal sense, some contractual problems could be avoided. Third of all, adopting 
Butler’s views could help expand copyright law further. Fourth of all, as machines were 
considered to be fictional human authors, the content created by them would actually be eligible 
for copyright protection. This could further incentivize companies and programmers to develop 
ever more sophisticated AI systems. Butler’s fifth argument is that, by adopting his idea, the 
courts would no longer have to think about the philosophical questions in regards to allowing 
computers legal rights.134 
However, Butler’s ideas have received some criticism. Evan Farr has stated that the theory 
proposed by Butler would actually increase the amount of litigation. The number of court cases 
stemming from the idea could be overwhelming on the legal system. Additionally, Butler has not 
really specified who would begin the necessary proceedings in relation to litigation. The 
enforcement of copyright is equally important in relation to copyright protection. With no 
feasible way to look after one’s own rights, it could be argued that there are no rights 
involved.135 
The last option that will be looked at in this thesis is that nobody should be granted copyright 
protection in regards to machine-generated content. According to this view, the works created by 
autonomous machines would simply go into the public domain. Samuelson writes that one of the 
fundamental aspects of the copyright system is that creators are awarded exclusive rights to their 
creations in order to motivate them. As robots do not require such motivation to be creative, what 
would the point of awarding them with copyright protection be?136 
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When it comes to economic incentives of creators, such as programmers, one could argue that 
the programmer is already being incentivized by selling or licensing the program that is capable 
of generating content. The user is also not left at a disadvantage. The user will be allowed to 
generate content with the machine that they have purchased and potentially utilize the raw data 
stemming from the program in creating something that does have commercial value, and which 
the user will be able to have rights to.137 
However, the idea that nobody should receive the rights to machine-generated content does not 
come without criticism. Certain scholars have insisted that rights should always be granted to 
someone or something. In addition, it has been argued that it would be rather difficult to prove 
whether the content in question was solely produced by a machine or whether it had some human 
input in its creation. Differentiating between the two could prove to be impossible.138 
Indeed, money is an important factor, and a very good motivator, for most people. A person 
could easily lie or fail to disclose that their creation had been generated by an autonomous 
machine. The person could alternatively make some change to the work in order to add human 
input into it, without necessarily improving the work in any way. Nevertheless, the person would 
be more interested in receiving the rights to the product rather than have it fall into the public 
domain for everyone to utilize freely.139 
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4.3. The Importance of Originality 
 
The concept of originality is understood as one of the most important aspects of copyright 
protection.140 Originality is a factor typically attributed to humans, as human beings are capable 
of creating original ideas by using their own minds.141 But what if machines could become as 
creative and as original as humans are? Several scholars, such as Andrés Guadamuz, Timothy L. 
Butler, and Tianxiang He, to name a few, have examined the concept of originality in relation to 
works created or generated by machines.142 143 144 
Guadamuz argues that due to the fact that originality is associated with humans, and copyright is 
geared towards protecting human-created content, non-human intellectual property rights do not 
exist.145 Guadamuz continues with the notion that the author of the work must be a person and 
not a machine. However, Guadamuz does provide a little bit of leniency on the matter by 
bringing up “The Next Rembrandt,” a joint-collaboration project by several Dutch museums, 
research institutions and Microsoft that shook the waves some years back in the fields of 
machine learning and copyright law.146 The project utilized machine learning in analyzing the 
works of painter Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn and created its own painting based on all the 
previous works. While Rembrandt’s works are already in the public domain, and the creators of 
The Next Rembrandt have not sought any intellectual property rights to their work, the project is 
nevertheless quite astounding from a technical and a legal perspective, as Guadamuz 
mentions.147  
Guadamuz also points out that the project may even challenge the way we understand originality 
in the first place. As the algorithms behind The Next Rembrandt are so sophisticated, they are 
able to come up with their own creative solutions in regards to the works created by them. This 
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means that the algorithm no longer relies solely on human input or programming. The machine is 
more than a mere tool that follows the directions and commands of its human programmers. It 
has been given the ability to make its own estimations in regards to what may be the most 
aesthetically pleasing choice.148 
Tianxiang He of the City University of Hong Kong has explored the idea of originality from the 
points of view of the Chinese and the American legal systems. He has introduced two different 
standards in relation to originality: subjective and objective.149 The subjective standard focuses 
on the process of creation in terms of copyright protection, whereas the objective standard looks 
at the end result.150 In terms of AI-generated content, He argues that the subjective standard 
should be utilized as it provides the ability to focus on how the specific work was created by the 
program.151 He is of the idea that the creative process should always include some sort of 
intention of the author of the work. In that sense, works created by accident should apparently 
not be granted copyright protection in He’s opinion. He writes that:  
“If we merely base on the end product to determine originality, then we may not be able to 
distinguish between the work of nature and the work of humans, if no evidence concerning the 
creative process can be garnered.”152 
He further argues that, because the quality of AI-generated content is so good, it can be very 
misleading in terms of originality if the creative process is not considered.153 However, in spite 
of He’s criticism, He also mentions that AI could one day become sophisticated enough to be 
able to generate truly original content, in which case the content could very well be copyright 
protected.154 In that sense, both He and Guadamuz seem to share similar ideas regarding the 
subject. 
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Timothy L. Butler examined the idea of originality in regards to the relationship between 
artificial intelligence and copyright protection almost four decades ago, back in 1982.155 In his 
writing, Butler brings up the concept of derivative works.156 In some instances, it was argued that 
AI-generated works as essentially derivative works and, as such, the copyright should belong to 
the owner of the software that created the content.157 However, Butler argues that because the 
work generated through AI algorithms is not actually “based upon” or derived from the program 
itself, the work cannot be consider to be derivative in nature.158 Butler notes the following: 
“In AI software applications, the work product bears little or no resemblance to the underlying 
program code which created it. Thus, it is not ‘derivative’ in a copyright sense.”159 
In that sense, Butler argues that machine-generated content cannot be considered to be derivative 
works due to the fact that AI-generated content does not fall within the frame of the concept.160 
In an attempt to provide a solution to the problem, Butler introduces the concept of “The 
Fictional Human Author” that would be attributed to the program or machine that generated the 
original content.161 According to this view, the rights to the product would go to the owner or 
owners of the program that generated the content. Butler further opines that machines should not 
be allowed to steal the concepts of originality and creativity from humans in his reasoning.162 
In relation to Butler’s solution, he came up with the following interpretation to Section 102 of 
the U.S. Copyright Act: 
“In determining the copyrightability of expressions wholly or partly produced by computer 
software and which are apparently thoughtful or indistinguishable from those produced by a 
human author, human authorship will be presumed and ‘authorship’ and ‘originality’ 
requirements of this Act will be deemed satisfied.”163 
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Four decades later, nobody has seemingly managed to come up with a satisfactory solution to the 
problem regarding artificial intelligence and originality. While several solutions have been 
provided by various different scholars, like previously mentioned, there is still no universal 
approach or a catch-all solution to the problem. The concept of AI has grown exponentially and 
to the point that AI-related solutions are utilized on a daily basis by corporations and individuals 
alike, but there are still some great debates in existence in relation to the concept of originality 
regarding this matter. 
 
4.4. Legal Personhood for Autonomous Machines 
 
The European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee published a report that outlined the 
possibility of “electronic personalities” for autonomous robots in 2017. The report caused quite a 
bit of controversy amongst scholars and experts in AI-related fields. Many of these scholars 
disliked the initiative due to the possible legal and ethical ramifications that could ensue due to 
its adoption.164 
Even before the report issued by the EU Parliament, the concept of legal personhood for robots 
has stirred up some debate among the scientific community. For instance, in 2007, Carson 
Reynolds and Masatoshi Ishikawa introduced us to Robot Thugs, autonomous machines that 
committed crimes. The aim of the creators of these thuggish robots was to figure out the 
accountability of the robots’ actions. Whether the robots could be held accountable for their 
actions or not, and if so, to what extent.165 
Ugo Pagollo has introduced a threefold level of abstraction in order to address the debate on the 
legal personhood of robots. The system is as follows: 
(i) “The legal personhood of robots as proper legal ‘persons’ with their constitutional 
rights (for example, it is noteworthy that the European Union existed for almost two 
decades without enjoying its own legal personhood); 
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(ii) The legal accountability of robots in contracts and business law (for example, slaves 
were neither legal persons nor proper humans under ancient Roman law and still, 
accountable to a certain degree in business law); 
(iii) New types of human responsibility for others’ behavior, e.g., extra-contractual 
responsibility or tortuous liability for AI activities (for example, cases of liability for 
defective products. Although national legislation may include data and information in 
the notion of product, it remains far from clear whether the adaptive and dynamic 
nature of AI through either machine learning techniques, or updates, or revisions, 
may entail or create a defend in the ‘product’).”166 
 
Pagollo points out that the report issued by the EU Parliament in relation to granting e-
personhood to robots has caused a lot of confusion among the experts. He suggests that:  
“it is unclear whether ‘the status of electronic persons’ refers to the full legal personhood of 
robots as proper legal ‘persons’, or regards their legal accountability in contracts and business 
law, or both.”167 
Indeed, confusion and division between the parties is quite apparent. While some scholars are for 
granting e-personhood to robots, for instance in order to end the current “slavery on robots”, 
other scholars believe that, in order for a robot to be considered a legal agent, it would require 
legal personhood.168 The granting of legal personhood seems to be at the core of the issue here. 
Sophia is a humanoid robot that is capable of socializing with humans. It has been developed by 
a Hong Kong-based company called Hanson Robotics along with Google. Sophia was first 
activated in 2015, and she made her first appearance in Texas in 2016. The algorithm behind 
Sophia’s programming has been both praised and criticized by experts. While people have been 
impressed by the level of sophistication regarding Sophia’s responses, experts have pointed out 
that many of the statements given by Sophia have, in fact, been scripted. Nevertheless, in spite of 
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the criticism, Sophia has turned quite a few heads in high places. Among other things, she has 
actually managed to attain citizenship in Saudi Arabia.169 
The case of Sophia is just one example of an autonomous robot that could enjoy e-personhood or 
even legal personhood within the European Union and elsewhere. However, concerns of safety 
have been expressed by notable figures in relation to autonomous robots, namely Bill Gates and 
Elon Musk. In 2015, the Future of Life Institute issued out an open letter that addressed the 
challenges and threats posed by artificial intelligence.170 
Pagollo separates legal agency from legal personhood and argues that robots would not 
necessarily require legal personhood in order to enjoy some capacity of legal agency. He brings 
up the European Union as an example by pointing out that the EU existed without any legal 
personhood for two decades. Opponents of the e-personhood initiative have further argued that if 
robots were considered to be legal agents, they should also be considered as legal persons. In this 
sense, robots could be akin to corporations from a legal point of view.  
Pagollo brings up three problems in relation to the above: first of all, granting robots legal 
personality is not the only way to deal with the issue. Other ways exist, too, such as registries for 
artificial agents. Second of all, there are several variations to legal personhood of corporations 
across the globe. For instance, the US and the EU systems are quite different from each other, 
namely in terms of privacy rights and political rights. Furthermore, corporations cannot be held 
criminally responsible for their actions. Third of all, the opponents of granting robots the status 
of legal persons should also be considered, who insist that granting robots this status could lead 
to human rights abuses and other such issues.171 
Pagollo proposes some new forms of accountability for robot actors, such as registries, the aim 
of which would be to prevent risks relating to robotic liability. Pagollo, however, admits that the 
modern robots may not yet be sophisticated enough to be eligible for any sort of legal status. 
However, just because the level of sophistication may not be as high as it should be in regards to 
the matter, Pagollo reminds us that we should still be prepared for the future.172 
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4.5. The Idea / Expression Dichotomy 
 
The idea / expression dichotomy is one of the most basic tenets of copyright law. It essentially 
states the following: 
“There is no copyright in an idea, copyright only subsists in its expression.”173 
In that sense, copyright does not actually protect ideas. Instead, copyright protection is provided 
for how the idea itself is expressed. This could be in writing or drawing, for instance, among 
many other ways. In that sense, if a person were to discover a new invention and outlined how 
the invention works on a piece of paper, only the words on the paper would be protected by 
copyright, not the invention itself. If somebody were to copy the invention and use it, they would 
not be held liable for copyright infringement. However, patent law does award protection to the 
invention.174 
One major problem associated with the idea / expression dichotomy is that it may sometimes be 
rather difficult to differentiate between the idea and its expression. This is known as a doctrine of 
merger, which essentially means that when an idea can only be expressed in a specific way, the 
expression itself is not protectable. Additionally, there can be ideas where the changing of the 
expression would also change the idea itself. These types of expressions are typically not 
considered to be protectable, because doing so would also issue protection to the idea itself.175 
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5. PERSPECTIVES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
As has been previously stated in this thesis, the situation in the European Union in relation to 
copyright law is mixed. While great attempts have been made at harmonizing the copyright 
legislation in different member states, the work is all but done. Several issues erupted in the 
beginning of the harmonization process. For instance, the individual member states questioned 
the purposes of harmonization in relation to the concept of originality due to differing viewpoints 
on the matter.176 But in spite of the differing viewpoints from the member states, the concept of 
originality has now been included in most member states’ copyright legislation. Furthermore, 
several aspects of copyright law have been harmonized within the EU member states, including 
those relating to computer programs, databases, and photographs.177 178 In addition, the concept 
of originality has been brought forward in the case law of the European Union.179 
Although many aspects of copyright law, especially those relating to the concept of originality, 
have been harmonized within the European Union, there are still quite a few member states with 
differing views on copyright law in-general that do not fall under the aforementioned 
harmonization attempts.180 For instance, Guadamuz mentions in his work the differences 
between Spanish and German copyright legislations. The Spanish copyright law specifically 
states that the author of the work has to be a natural person. The situation in Germany is 
different, because the German copyright law does not include the requirement of a natural person 
to be involved in the creation of copyrightable content.181 
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Several legal cases have attempted to bring some clarification in regards to copyright law within 
the European Union.182 These cases include the notable Infopaq-case, and the cases of BSA, 
FAPL, Painer, Football Dataco, and SAS.183 The aforementioned cases will be looked at in more 
detail below. 
In the case of BSA v. Ministervo Kultury (C 393/09), it was contested whether graphical user 
interfaces (GUIs) could be protected by copyright under the Information Society Directive 
(Directive 2001/29) or the Software Directive. The case was initially brought to a Czech court 
due to the fact that the Ministry of Culture of the Czech Republic had refused to authorize the 
collective administration of copyrights to computer programs. According to the Ministry, the 
copyright law would only protect the object and source codes of the program, but not the GUI 
included due to the fact that the simple nature of the function of the GUI itself.184 The case was 
referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU.) The CJEU eventually ruled that 
GUIs could not be protected under the Software Directive due to the fact that a GUI could not be 
considered as a computer program. However, it was decided that a GUI could be protected under 
the Information Society Directive for as long as the GUI in question was the author’s own 
intellectual creation.185 
The FAPL-case, also known as the joined cases of Football Association Premier League Ltd and 
Others v. QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services 
Ltd (C-429/08), is a joined case of the CJEU. The case involved a number of questions, but the 
most relevant question in the context of this thesis is whether the live transmission of a premier 
league football match was protected under copyright law. In these cases, foreign decoder cards 
were used in order to watch live premier league football matches in the United Kingdom.186 The 
High Court referred the case to the CJEU, and the CJEU subsequently ruled that the football 
matches in question were not protected by copyright law due to the fact that they were 
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considered to be sporting events, which do not fall under the protection of the Copyright 
Directive. In spite of the fact that the live transmission of the football match was not protected 
under the Directive, the court held that the works associated with the football match itself, such 
as the opening video sequence of the football match, the premier league anthem, and various 
graphics associated with the game, were actually protected under the Copyright Directive.187 
The case of Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH (C-145/10) involved a freelance photographer 
named Ms. Painer who had collected several photographs over several years. These photographs 
had particularly been taken of children. Ms. Painer sold her works off eventually. However, she 
did not consent to the publication of the works sold by her. One child by the name of Natascha 
K. appeared in some of the photographs taken and later sold by Ms. Painer. The photographs 
featuring Natascha K. were used by authorities in missing person posters. Natascha K. managed 
to flee from her captors in 2006. Subsequently, the photographs that featured Natascha K. were 
published in various newspapers, magazines and websites, none of which credited Ms. Painer as 
the original author of the photographs. Consequently, Ms. Painer sued the persons that used her 
photographs without her consent.188 
The defendants in the case insisted that they had not known the original author of the 
photographs due to the fact that they had received the photographs from a news source that did 
not mention the details of the original photographer. The case was referred to the CJEU, 
according to which the photographs were, indeed, protected by copyright law. However, the 
court also ruled that the photographs could be published by the media without the consent of the 
original author for the purposes of assisting the authorities in finding any missing persons or 
otherwise.189 
The case of Football Dataco Ltd and Others v. Yahoo! UK Ltd and Others (C-604/10) deals with 
the use of databases. In this case, fixture lists had been published by Football Dataco and the 
other claimants in the case. The defendants of the case had utilized the lists published by 
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Football Dataco without paying for their usage. According to Dataco, the lists were protected 
under the Database Copyright and the Database Rights. As such, the defendants should pay for 
utilizing them. The case was referred to the CJEU by the High Court of the United Kingdom.190 
The following questions were asked of the CJEU: 
1. In Article 3(1) of Directive 96/9 … what is meant by “databases which, by reason of the 
selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual 
creation” and in particular: 
(a) Should the intellectual effort and skill of creating data be excluded; 
(b) Does “selection or arrangement” include adding important significance to a pre-
existing item of data (as in fixing the date of a football match), and 
(c) Does “author’s own intellectual creation” require more than significant labour and 
skill from the author, if so what? 
2. Does the Directive preclude national rights in the nature of copyright in databases other 
than those provided for by Directive 96/9?191 
 
The CJEU answered positively to all the other questions but 1(b). According to the court, the 
skill and labour associated with the selection or arrangement of the data is not sufficient as such 
to provide copyright protection. Originality has to be involved as defined by the court. In that 
sense, some sort of creativity must be included in the compilation of the data within the 
database.192 
The case of SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd (C-406/10) involved two rival 
companies in the field of computer programming. SAS, the claimant, owned the copyright to a 
software environment known as Base SAS. Their customer were allowed to use the program in 
order to create applications that functioned in their program’s language. World Programming 
Limited (WPL) constructed a similar system (WPS) that could run applications created with the 
                                                 
190 “Football Dataco copyright in databases,” Fieldfisher, available at: 
https://www.fieldfisher.com/en/insights/football-dataco-copyright-in-databases, accessed on 29.01.2020 
191 “Football Dataco: skill and labour is dead!” by Estelle Derclaye, available at: 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2012/03/01/football-dataco-skill-and-labour-is-dead/, accessed on 29.01.2020 
192 Ibid. 
59 
 
SAS language by emulating and reverse-engineering it. The outputs and inputs were integrated 
into the WPS. Subsequently, SAS sued WPL for copyright infringement.193 
The case was eventually brought to the CJEU, which subsequently ruled that the functionality, 
the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program are not 
protected by copyright. Furthermore, the reverse-engineering of programs is allowed for as long 
as the person reverse-engineering the program has obtained a license to access and utilize the 
program in question.194 
Finally, the famous case of Infopaq International v. Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08) 
involves a company called Infopaq International (hereinafter referred to as Infopaq) that 
specialized in writing summarized articles. The articles were summarized from Danish 
newspapers by the use of a certain ‘data capture process.’ The articles are first selected by the 
autonomous program and then sent to the customers by email.195 
Danske Dagblades Forening (hereinafter referred to as DDF), an association tasked with 
assisting their clients with copyright matters, found out about Infopaq’s business model. 
Apparently, Infopaq had scanned newspaper articles for commercial purposes without the 
consent of the right holders. Subsequently, DDF filed a complaint against Infopaq, which 
conversely contested DDF’s claims and sued them in order for the DDF to allow Infopaq to 
continue their conduct.196 
The case was eventually referred to the CJEU. In its decision, the court had to determine whether 
the summarized articles were original enough to warrant copyright protection. The problem was 
that the summarizations were generated by a machine and not a human being. The court 
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eventually defined originality as being the “author’s own intellectual creation,” thus ruling that 
the summarizations could, indeed, be granted copyright protection.197 
 
5.1. Finland 
 
The Finnish legal system is a unique mix of different legal doctrines and customs. While the 
legal system in Finland is not considered to be a part of the common law system that is widely 
utilized in countries like the Great Britain and the United States, the system is also not purely 
based on the civil law system that is used in most of the European Union, especially in France 
and Germany. Similarly, the copyright law of Finland has taken shape from various different 
legal systems and customs.198 As such, the threshold of originality in Finnish copyright law is 
somewhere in between the rigid civil law concept and the more lenient common law threshold of 
originality.199 Alen-Savikko has pointed out that Finland and other Nordic countries have not 
generally had any need to change their copyright legislation to reflect the European Union’s legal 
decisions due to the fact that Nordic countries are already following similar principles in their 
own copyright laws.200 
According to a 1987 report by the Finnish Copyright Committee, works must be independent and 
original in order to receive copyright protection. As such, the author’s creativity has to be 
reflected in the work in question. According to the report, the computer is considered as a mere 
tool in the creation process. The creativity itself stems from the human being that is issuing 
commands to the computer.201 Interestingly, the concept of originality has not been defined in the 
Finnish Copyright Act. However, the word “alkuperäinen” (original) has been mentioned in the 
Act and its amendments a total of 13 times, expressing that such a concept exists in Finnish 
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copyright law.202 Case law has also included the concept of originality. For example, the 
Copyright Council has examined the concept in its various decisions that will be looked at in 
more detail below.203 
The Finnish Copyright Council (Tekijänoikeusneuvosto) is tasked with handling copyright 
matters for the Ministry of Education and Culture, and making recommendations about how the 
Copyright Act (404/1961) should be interpreted.204 The Council has made various decisions in 
relation to copyright law over the past decades. In the next following paragraphs, some of these 
decisions will be looked at in more detail from before and after the Infopaq case. It should be 
noted here that the decisions made by the Copyright Council are merely recommendations and 
thus they are not legally binding in nature.205 
TN 1987:8 is a recommendation by the Copyright Council in which the applicant (A) had 
published a biography of a famous singer named Georg Malmsten. As the author of the work, A 
had the rights to the work in question. Another person had taken parts of the original work and 
used them in their own work without citating or crediting the original work created by A. 
According to the Copyright Council’s recommendation, the person that had taken the citations 
from A’s work without crediting them had violated the Copyright Act and the moral rights of the 
applicant.206 While the right of citation may not directly be the subject of this thesis, this case has 
nevertheless been introduced here for the purposes of clarity and demonstration as the case has 
some importance in relation to the concept of originality, which is one of the concepts examined 
in this thesis. 
In TN 2005:10, a person by the name of Sylvi Kantele had asked the Copyright Council as to 
whether the word “Aapponen” (a play on words “aapinen” and “aakkonen,” meaning the ABC-
book and letters) could be granted copyright protection, in spite of the fact that Aapponen is also 
a Finnish surname. The Copyright Council decided that the term “Aapponen” would not receive 
copyright protection due to the high threshold of originality used in Finnish copyright law. The 
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term itself was simply not original enough to warrant copyright protection, according to the 
views of the Council.207 
TN 2006:14 had to deal with the protection of a periodical review. A certain company asked the 
Council whether a periodical review would be entitled to receive copyright protection. 
Secondarily, the company wanted to know whether logos of certain magazines were protected by 
copyright. According to the Council, the work would have to be the result of spiritual creation in 
order to be eligible for copyright protection. As such, the work would have to be an original 
creation of the author in question in order to pass the threshold of originality. The Council 
decided that the review itself did not pass the threshold of originality due to the fact that it was 
not original enough in terms of the Copyright Act. Similarly, the logos in question were not 
original enough to warrant copyright protection.208 
TN 2010:2 dealt with the copyright protection of a song verse. In TN 2010:2, the applicant had 
translated the song of “Pippi Longstocking,” the main character of a famous children’s novel, in 
Finnish. The applicant views that they own the rights to the translated version of the song. 
According to the applicant, the Swedish furniture store Ikea had used the Finnish translation in 
their advertisement campaign, dubbed “Heikun keikun” without the applicant’s permission. The 
expression was used by the applicant in the Finnish translation of the original song. Ikea 
contended that they had not used the translated version of the song in their campaign. They had 
merely used the expression “heikun keikun,” which, according to the furniture giant, was a 
common expression in the Finnish language. The Copyright Council sided with Ikea’s views. 
The expression was not original enough to receive copyright protection. However, the verse in 
the song was deemed to be original enough to warrant copyright protection. The Copyright 
Council thus also sided with the applicant on the matter, but only in relation to the full verse and 
not the shorter expression used. TN 2010:2 is a decision rendered after the CJEU’s Infopaq 
case.209 
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Alen-Savikko has mentioned that news articles written or generated by autonomous systems 
have reached the threshold of originality in decisions rendered by the Copyright Council.210 As a 
requirement, the news articles in question have to be original enough insofar as they could not be 
replicated in a similar fashion. As such, Alen-Savikko recommends that such news articles be 
long and informative enough to warrant this originality.211 
 
5.2. United Kingdom 
 
The situation in the United Kingdom in relation to copyright law and artificial intelligence is 
rather unique when compared to other countries, because the UK actually has come up with 
legislation in relation to machine-generated content. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 
1988 (CDPA) includes a provision for computer-generated material. According to the CDPA 
Section 9(3): 
“In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the 
author shall be taken to the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the 
work are undertaken.”212 
 
As such, the laws relating to copyright in the UK could be interpreted as recognizing computers 
as content creators. In that sense, computer-generated content could be granted copyright 
protection under the CDPA.213 However, it should be noted here that the term “computer-
generated” has been described as meaning that there is no human author involved in the creation 
of the work in question.214 However, Alen-Savikko has interpreted the meaning of the CDPA as 
                                                 
210 “Tekoälyn tuotokset ja omaperäisyysvaatimus – kohti koneorientoitunutta tekijänoikeutta?” by Alen-Savikko et 
al, Lakimies, p. 986 
211 Ibid. 
212 “The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988”, available at: 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/9, accessed on 02.03.2020 
213 Artificial Intelligence in EU Copyright Law by Dustin Jaacks, available at 
https://medium.com/@dustin.jaacks/artificial-intelligence-in-eu-copyright-law-55798700da4, accessed on 
09.03.2020 
214 “The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988”, available at: 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/9, accessed on 09.03.2020 
64 
 
meaning that the work in question must have an author. She explains that the work must be a 
result of the human mind. As such, Alen-Savikko is of the opinion that the work cannot be the 
product of a machine or an animal. She, however, notes that the UK law recognizes legal persons 
as authors in relation to computer-generated content.215 
The threshold of originality is considerably low in the UK when compared to other countries, 
such as the previously mentioned Spain or Germany. This has to do with the standard that has 
been applied to the granting of copyrights. In the United Kingdom, the standard that has been 
used is determined through the “skill, labour and judgment” test.216 However, some scholars, 
such as Deming Liu, have suggested that after the Infopaq and Painer cases, the current doctrine 
has been diminished and, as such, the threshold of originality has become stricter in the UK.217 
However, Alen-Savikko has noted that, because of Brexit, the United Kingdom may very well 
discard the previous judgments by the CJEU and continue to follow their prior stance on 
copyright law, thus returning to the use of the “skill, labour and judgment” test.218 
The stance of the United Kingdom in relation to copyright and machine-generated content has 
been discussed further in case law. The case of Express Newspapers v. Liverpool Daily Post 
from 1985 is one of the most notable cases involving the use of a computer in relation to the 
creation of content. In this case, a competition involving the delivery of cards to its readers was 
published by the plaintiffs. Each card had a sequence of five letters to be tested against the 
winning sequences published by the Express group newspapers. The winning sequences were 
written on a five row grid and five letter columns. The Liverpool Daily Post repeated the 
winning sequences in their articles as the players did not need to buy the newspaper to get the 
cards. The plaintiffs consequently sued the Liverpool Daily in order to stop their current 
conduct.219 
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According to the defendants, the published sequences had been computer-generated and, as such, 
would not receive copyright protection as an author was missing from the creation of the work. 
In this landmark decision, the judge ruled that the computer was a mere tool of the programmer 
that issued commands to the computer itself to produce the sequences. The plaintiffs were thus 
awarded the injunction.220 The judge issued the following comment on the case: 
“The computer was no more than the tool […]. It is as unrealistic as it would be to suggest that, 
if you write your work with a pen, it is the pen which is the author of the work rather than the 
person who drives the pen.”221 
 
Although the Express Newspapers case came before the CDPA, the ruling is rather analogous 
with the current law. While the judge’s arguments are clear, some mystery still remains in 
relation to the author.222 For instance, Angela Adrian has noted that the pen analogy used by the 
judge in the case may be used to enforce possession of the copyright to the user and not the 
programmer of the program.223 
Another interesting case in relation to copyright law in the UK is that of Nova Productions Ltd v. 
Mazooma Games Ltd. In this case, Nova Productions Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Nova) was 
an arcade game creator. Mazooma Games Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Mazooma) was a rival 
company to Nova by making similar products as Nova did. Mazooma created a video game that 
utilized similar assets as a game previously created by Nova did. Nova subsequently sued 
Mazooma for copyright infringement. The lower court rejected the case, but Nova appealed.224 
The appeal court eventually held the case in favor of the defendants by stating the following: 
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“There was no additional protection for a series or graphic works such as moving elements of 
the game… given the concession that there was no frame-for-frame reproduction, there had been 
no relevant copying.”225 
 
According to the court’s reasoning, computer programs may share similar functions without 
necessarily infringing copyright, as per the so-called “idea-expression dichotomy.”226 The 
dichotomy itself states that “there is no copyright in an idea, copyright only subsists in its 
expression.”227 As such, according to the dichotomy, copyright does not grant protection to 
ideas, only the expression of the ideas in question.228 The judge issued the following remarks 
regarding the case: 
“Before leaving this topic there is one further complexity I must consider and that is the effect of 
player input. The appearance of any particular screen depends to some extent on the way the 
game is being played. For example, when the rotary knob is turned the cue rotates around the 
cue ball. Similarly, the power of the shot is affected by the precise moment the player chooses to 
press the play button. The player is not, however, an author of any of the artistic works created 
in the successive frame images. His input is not artistic in nature and he has contributed no skill 
or labour of an artistic kind. Nor has he undertaken any of the arrangements necessary for the 
creation of the frame images. All he has done is to play the game.”229 
 
The reasoning provided by the judge implies that authorship could only be granted to a person 
that “contributes skill and labour of an artistic kind.”230 
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6. PERSPECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
In the United States, copyright matters are handled on the federal level as opposed to the state 
level. This essentially means that individual states have less authority in relation to copyright law 
in the U.S. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides the general framework for copyright law within 
the United States. The U.S. Constitution vests the Congress with the ability to create laws 
relating to copyright.231 
The United States Copyright Office handles all matters in relation to copyright within the United 
States. The Copyright Office issues out a Compendium on best practices in relation to copyright 
registration. 802.5© of the Compendium states the following: 
“To be copyrightable, musical works, like all works of authorship, must be of human origin. A 
musical work created by solely by an animal would not be registrable, such as a bird song or 
whale song. Likewise, music generated entirely by a mechanical or an automated process is not 
copyrightable. For example, the automated transposition of a musical work from one key to 
another is not registrable. Nor could a musical composition created solely by a computer 
algorithm be registered.”232 
 
The Compendium also includes a human authorship requirement, which effectively means that 
the work in question has to have been created by a human being.233 In that sense, it would seem 
that the United States does not allow machine-generated content to be copyrightable. Hristov has 
pointed out the harshness of the current stance, and argued that the lack of financial incentives 
may hinder the creative process of humans working on AI-related projects.234 However, in spite 
of Hristov’s criticism, companies are already heavily investing in AI-related solutions. When it 
comes to the creative side of AI, the creations have typically gone into the public domain, such 
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as in the case of Dewey, an artificial intelligence author that has authored books with very little 
human input involved.235 
In addition to the aforementioned legislation, there is also some case law involved in relation to 
copyright law and machine-generated works. Some of the most profound cases regarding 
copyright law will be looked at below in more detail. 
Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. et al, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) is a U.S. case 
that looked into the concept of originality in relation to copyright law. In this case, the plaintiff, 
by the name of Alfred Bell, was a creator of mezzotint reproductions of original paintings by 
several eighteenth and nineteenth century artists. The original paintings had already entered the 
public domain and thus had no copyright protection any longer. Catalda Fine Arts, the defendant 
in the case, was not able to access the original copies of the works in the public domain, so they 
used the reproductions created by Alfred Bell, without having the authorization of Mr. Bell. Mr. 
Bell thereafter sued Catalda Fine Arts for copyright infringement. In court, the defendants argued 
that the reproductions were not original works and thus should not be copyrightable. The court 
eventually sided with Mr. Bell by stating that even slight changes in works constitute original 
works and are therefore copyrightable.236 
Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. is a landmark case of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, presided over by Justice O’Connor. In this case, Feist Publications (hereinafter 
referred to as Feist) was a company that specialized in collecting and compiling telephone 
directories from the area of Kansas. Rural Telephone Service Company (hereinafter referred to 
as Rural) was a telecommunications company that was required to compile a phone directory of 
all of their customers, free of charge, due to the monopolistic nature of their operation. Feist 
sought to obtain a license to the information compiled by Rural, but Rural denied their request. 
Consequently, Feist copied the information without Rural’s consent and were soon caught in the 
act. Rural sued Feist for copyright infringement. In their claim, Rural argued that they held 
copyright to the information in accordance to the sweat of the brow doctrine, according to which 
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copyright would be given to anyone that spent a significant amount of time and effort in their 
work. The lower courts agreed with Rural’s notion.237 
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court of the United States. Justice O’Connor 
eventually delivered his judgment, opining that information alone could not be copyrighted, but 
only the way the information was presented and arranged. As such, no creative expression was 
involved on Rural’s part. Because of that, it was decided that Rural had no copyright over the 
works they had compiled.238 
One more case in relation to copyright law and originality is that of Naruto v Slater. Mr. Slater 
was a photographer traveling in Indonesia and photographing the wildlife. In a strange turn of 
events, a macaque monkey, dubbed Naruto by the plaintiffs, picked up Mr. Slater’s unattended 
camera and took selfies of herself. Mr. Slater subsequently shared the photographs online. The 
publishing of the photographs, however, caused a stir among animal activist groups. PETA, an 
animal activist organization, filed a lawsuit against Mr. Slater as “next friend to Naruto” for 
copyright infringement. The case was accepted and a panel was formed to decide whether Naruto 
had any claim to the photographs. It was eventually decided that while Naruto may have had 
constitutional standing to claim copyright infringement, Naruto in fact lacked statutory standing 
for her claim. The court reasoned that the Copyright Act “does not expressly authorize animals to 
file copyright infringement suits.” As such, the case was dismissed.239 
The aforementioned cases are some examples of how the U.S. legal system deals with matters 
related to copyright law and originality. While the cases detailed above do not deal with the 
concept of artificial intelligence in itself, the cases provide some insight into how AI-related 
matters could be handled in the U.S. legal system. In particular, the case of Naruto v. Slater gives 
some insight into whether non-human authors could be granted copyright protection.240 The 
answer seems to be a negative one, as the panel dismissed the case due to lack of statutory 
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standing on the monkey’s part. Similarly, a case involving the creation of an autonomous 
machine and copyright could very well be dismissed by the U.S. courts.241 
The Statute of Anne was enacted in 1710 in the United Kingdom. In spite of it being a piece of 
UK legislation, the Statute of Anne has served as a reference for early copyright law in the 
United States. Many of the provisions from the Act were utilized in the first U.S. copyright laws, 
such as a 14-year duration for copyright.242 However, as the years progressed, international 
cooperation became more important due to the international nature of copyright law. The need 
for harmonization became more evident, and eventually, the U.S. copyright laws started to look 
more and more like its international counterparts. The duration of copyright has gradually 
increased, and the amount of copyrightable works has risen.243 The U.S. eventually became a 
party to the Berne Convention in 1989, furthering the harmonization and cooperation between 
other member countries of the Convention. However, in spite of all the harmonization and 
cooperation, the United States still have their own unique way of dealing with copyright law.244 
The threshold of creativity is considerably low in the United States.245 This most likely stems 
from the United States’ utilitarian perspective on copyright law. The idea is that granting 
copyright to the original creator is beneficial for the society.246 In the United States, the showing 
of “at least some minimal degree of creativity” is enough to meet the standard for creativity.247 In 
that sense, the amount of work committed to the individual creation does not matter in terms of 
granting the work copyright protection. All that matters in this regard is that there is at least some 
creativity involved in the creation of the work in question. However, if creativity is not involved, 
in spite of the amount of time committed to the creation of the work, the work will not suffice for 
copyright protection.248 
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Another thing typical for common law systems in terms of copyright law is that of fixation. The 
United States in particular requires fixation in order for a work to qualify for copyright 
protection.249 The law states that the work must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression. In 
other words, the work must be tied to some medium in which it can be perceived, reproduced or 
otherwise communicated.250 For example, a poem would be considered fixed if it was written 
down on a piece of paper. In that case, the paper serves as the medium that can be utilized for 
perceiving the work. Furthermore, the medium does not have to be readable by humans. It is 
enough that a machine is able to interpret and perceive the work in order for it to be fixed. As 
such, a computer’s memory may very well serve as a medium for some types of works, such as 
computer programs.251 U.S. law further states that the fixation must be made by the author of the 
work or by a person authorized by the original author of the work in order to be eligible for 
copyright protection.252 
While the level of creativity is considered to be low in the United States, the level is by no means 
nonexistent. There are plenty of things that could be considered creative that do not exceed the 
minimum level of creativity in the United States. For instance, short phrases and headlines do not 
generally receive copyright protection in the U.S. even though coming up with clever 
catchphrases or headlines for newspaper articles does arguably require at least some creativity by 
the author.253 Ginsburg writes that it would make sense to exclude short phrases from receiving 
copyright protection due to the fact that they are essential for authors in order to create their own 
works. If individual words or short phrases were deemed to be eligible for copyright, it would 
become more difficult for authors to come up with words they could use for their creations.254 
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7. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
 
In the previous chapters, this thesis has explored the perspectives of different European Union 
member states – namely Finland and the United Kingdom – and the United States of America as 
a whole in relation to copyright law and artificial intelligence. This chapter will focus on 
discussing the similarities and differences of the aforementioned countries in relation to the 
subject. The chapter will begin with analyzing the similarities between the examined countries, 
after which the differences will be further discussed in more detail. 
 
7.1. Similarities 
 
Thanks to international cooperation and harmonization, there are quite a few similarities between 
the countries examined in this thesis in relation to copyright law. The Berne Convention has 
promoted cooperation and harmonization in relation to the matter. For instance, the Berne 
Convention has set a 50-year minimum for copyright duration after the author’s death.255 
However, countries part of the Convention can choose to have longer durations for copyright at 
their will, and, as a matter of fact, both the European Union and the United States have chosen to 
set the duration at 70 years after the death of the author.256 
Perhaps one of the biggest similarities between the European Union and the United States in 
relation to copyright law is what copyright actually is and how it is interpreted in different legal 
systems. The purpose of copyright is to protect audiovisual and other such works from being 
infringed upon.257 While there are some differences in relation to what exactly is protected and 
why, the purpose of copyright remains the same between both, the European Union and the 
United States.258 
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Another similarity between the EU and the US in relation to copyright is that the threshold of 
creativity is considerably low in both places.259 In the European Union, it is enough that it is 
showed that the work in question has been created by the person in question. In the United 
States, some minimal degree of creativity is required in order to pass the threshold of 
creativity.260 In that sense, it could be construed that copyright protection is relatively easy to 
attain in both systems, for as long as the work in question is original, creative, and created by the 
person seeking protection for their work. Furthermore, neither place requires any formal 
registration to be made in order to have a work or creation protected by copyright. In both 
systems, copyright protection is automatic in nature.261 
 
7.2. Differences 
 
There are quite a few differences in existence in relation to the systems utilized in both, the 
United States and the European Union. In addition, there are also some differences between 
different EU member states, in spite of numerous attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, at 
harmonizing the copyright law within the European Union.262 In this regard, one of the biggest 
differences in relation to copyright law between the two continents is how copyright law has 
been formed and how it is being interpreted in both places. 
When compared to the European Union, the situation in the United States is quite different in 
relation to copyright law. For one, copyright law is handled on the federal level in the US, as 
opposed to being handled by individual member states as is partially being done in the EU, apart 
from union-wide harmonization attempts.263 For two, the legal systems that govern these two 
continents are different, for the most part. The United States utilizes the common law system, 
whereas many of the EU member states utilize the civil law system. The United Kingdom is one 
of the few countries within the European Union that also utilizes the common law legal system. 
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The duration of copyright law also differs between the United States and the European Union on 
some parts. While the duration itself is the same by default, 70 years after the author’s death, 
there are some exceptions included that differ between the two continents. For example, in case 
of works whose authors cannot be tracked down, the duration of copyright is 70 years from the 
date of the publication within the EU. However, in the United States, the duration of copyright 
for works with no known authors is actually 95 years from publication or 120 years from the 
creation of the work, depending on whichever of the two expires first.264 
There are also some fundamental differences in relation to copyright law in the continents 
examined. While the purpose of copyright remains basically the same between the EU and the 
US, the target of protection is a bit different. In the European Union, the target of protection is 
typically the author of the work. In the United States, however, the target of protection is the 
work in question. The United States relies on a utilitarian idea of copyright law, which entails 
that allowing authors to have property rights over their creations will incentivize them to make 
works for the greater benefit of society.265 
While registration of copyright is technically not required in either the United States or the 
European Union, registering a work with the U.S. Copyright Office is actually very beneficial in 
terms of having a work protected. In cases of copyright infringement, it is much easier to prove 
ownership to the infringed work if the work in question has been registered with the Copyright 
Office in the United States. In fact, the registration of copyright is a prerequisite for judicial 
enforcement of copyright, in relation to works created in the United States. Also, registration is 
required in order to be entitled to statutory damages and attorney’s fees in relation to all works, 
regardless of their country of origin.266 
While the threshold of creativity is similar in both the US and the EU, the quantum of creativity 
is a different matter in relation to copyright law. In the United States, short phrases and simple 
designs are not typically considered to be creative enough to warrant copyright protection. 
However, the stance of the European Union seems to be quite different on the matter, as was 
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demonstrated by the decisions of the Infopaq case. According to the judgment, a sequence of 11 
words met the standard required for obtaining copyright.267 
Plenty of other differences exist, as well, but they will not be looked into for the purposes of this 
thesis. Instead, the next part will be looking into the similarities and differences in relation to 
computer-generated content and copyright law within both continents. 
 
7.3. On the status of computer-generated works 
 
When it comes to computer-generated works and their eligibility for copyright protection within 
the European Union and the United States, there are both similarities and differences within 
these systems. While the United States does not allow for computer-generated content to be 
protected by copyright, as has been implied in the U.S. Copyright Act and shown in subsequent 
case law regarding the matter, the stance of the European Union is a little different in the sense 
that the EU is a bit more approving of non-human authors being eligible for copyright protection. 
This has been shown by the EU’s e-personhood initiative, for example.268 Furthermore, some 
members states, such as Finland and the United Kingdom,  
The United Kingdom is on the forefront of granting copyright protection to works generated by 
autonomous machines. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act clearly provides for protection to 
works created by non-humans.269 However, the situation in other member states of the European 
Union is quite different. For example, both Spain and Germany have clauses in their copyright 
legislations that explicitly state that authors must be humans in order to have their works 
protected by copyright.270 The situation in Finland, however, seems to be quite promising, due to 
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the fact that news articles generated by autonomous machines have been eligible for copyright 
protection.271 
The United States have dealt with matters in relation to originality and authorship differently 
from other countries. The standard utilized in the United States was set by the landmark case of 
Feist Publications.272 The case itself has already been discussed in a previous chapter of this 
thesis and, as such, it will not be looked at in more detail here. However, the importance of the 
outcome of the case should not be understated. The case set a standard for copyright protection, 
according to which protection may only be granted to components or parts of a work that are 
original to the author of the work in question. The standard itself is known as “modicum of 
creativity.”273 The standard set by the Feist Publications case is considerably different from the 
one utilized in the Infopaq case in the European Union. The standard could essentially mean that 
works with no human involvement would not receive copyright protection.274 
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8. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
 
The future implications regarding the relationship between artificial intelligence and copyright 
law are two-fold: for one, the developments of artificial intelligence and machine learning have 
to be taken into account. For two, the development of copyright law is of vital importance in 
determining what may be protected by copyright regimes in the future. The first point deals with 
how the concepts of artificial intelligence may evolve in the upcoming years. The second point 
looks into how copyright law itself evolves, based on the first point and other factors that may be 
involved. 
Science-fiction typically envisions artificial intelligence to become smarter than human beings. 
Autonomous machines and robots are depicted as self-learning and sentient beings with feelings 
and emotions, and the capability to produce artistic works.275 However, the fact itself seems to be 
quite far away from the fiction. The reality surrounding artificial intelligence, while still very 
astounding, is far from what science-fiction envisions. In fact, it might take several decades or 
even centuries for AI to reach the level of humans in terms of abstract thinking, let alone to reach 
what some scholars consider as “singularity.”276 
While autonomous robots may not be able to reach the level of humans anytime soon, AI and 
machine learning algorithms are able to produce works of artistic quality. The relationship 
between artificial intelligence and copyright law is thus rather important when looking into the 
future implications regarding these two concepts. The concept of originality is also an important 
part of the question, as has been pointed out by Andrés Guadamuz. According to Guadamuz, the 
international copyright system lacks proper harmonization in relation to the concept of 
originality.277 
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Indeed, the differences between the European Union and the United States in relation to the 
subject are still far too wide. The thresholds for originality are much too different in order to 
promote any type of harmonization on the matter. Similarly, differences between the United 
Kingdom and other member states remain. The CDPA does not appear to be completely in line 
with the decision of the Infopaq case.278 
The strict requirement for originality that has been utilized in the United States may very well 
disallow copyright protection from works created solely by machines. This type of interpretation 
could lead to economic problems as the amount of content generated by autonomous machines 
increased in the future.279 
Several companies, such as Amazon, Google and Netflix, are using AI as a tool for improving 
their services. Amazon has actually deployed a system known as “Deep Scalable Sparse Tensor 
Network Engine” (DSSTNE, also known as ‘Destiny’ for short.) The system is used for 
displaying recommendations for users of Amazon based on their purchase histories or browsing 
habits. The system has also been made available to the public, for free, which may lead to other 
companies to use the system in order to provide and improve their services.280 
While the systems have been created by humans, the systems themselves generate information 
procedurally, without any human involvement involved. As such, these systems are able to 
generate unique works independently. As things currently stand, the United Kingdom would 
likely be the only country where the creations generated by Amazon’s Destiny would be eligible 
for copyright protection.281 
Major companies like Amazon and Netflix may not be interested in having their works protected 
by copyright, especially since Amazon has released their Destiny system to the public, other 
companies utilizing these tools and similar tools may be of a different opinion. Harmonization 
and specification of the law would do wonders for the current situation. There is definitely need 
for clarification in this regard.282 
                                                 
278 Guadamuz, p. 18 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid., p. 19 
282 Ibid. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
 
Artificial intelligence and machine learning are vastly growing phenomenon that have fascinated 
humankind for centuries. While the terminology may be more recent, the concept of artificial 
intelligence has been around for much longer, as has been shown in the beginning of this thesis. 
The history of artificial intelligence, from the theories of ancient philosophers all the way to the 
Dartmouth conference in 1956, to the present day, and even beyond to the future, artificial 
intelligence continues to fascinate people all over the globe. While science-fiction has arguably 
given unrealistic connotations to the concept of AI, scholars have managed to ease the public’s 
tension, at least for the most part. 
The purpose of this thesis has been to look into whether machine-generated content could be 
eligible for copyright protection. In that sense, the concept of originality has played a key part in 
determining whether AI-generated content could actually pass the threshold of originality in 
order to be eligible for copyright protection. This thesis has further discussed the concept of 
authorship and who the author should actually be when it comes to AI-generated content. 
This thesis has covered several topics, examples, and concepts in relation to the subject of the 
thesis, artificial intelligence and copyright law. The introductory part has outlined the 
background, the research questions and limitations, the research methods and sources, and the 
structure of the thesis in detail. The second chapter defined artificial intelligence by covering the 
history and definition of artificial intelligence as a concept. Furthermore, the differences between 
artificial intelligence and machine learning were touched upon.  
The third chapter outlined some justifications for copyright protection, but also arguments 
against copyright law. These arguments and justifications were of normative and doctrinal 
nature. The chapter further introduced some limitations for copyright law. Some of the 
arguments that were looked at in favor of copyright protection were in relation to the protection 
of value, marketplace competition, aesthetic merit, and the use of humans as proxy authors. The 
arguments against copyright protection included things like the humanness of authorship, the 
responsibilities that come with the rights granted, originality, and derivative works. These 
arguments were further divided into several subcategories and were looked at in more detail in 
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the corresponding chapter. Finally, the exceptions and limitations of copyright law were 
discussed. As the chapter demonstrated, the access to information and the freedom of speech are 
among the reasons for limiting copyright protection of creations. 
The fourth chapter looked at the concept of authorship and looked into the issues relating to 
artificial intelligence authorship. Furthermore, it was discussed who the owner of the copyright 
would be in-case machine-generated content were deemed to be eligible for copyright protection. 
The first part of the chapter discussed the issues relating to authorship in regards to the subject of 
the thesis. A total of four issues were listed. These were in relation to the incentives, the concept 
of originality, the duration of copyright, and the fact that AI is capable of producing a high 
amount of works in a very little time span. The second part of the chapter focused on who the 
owner of the copyright could be in a situation where machine-generated content was 
copyrightable. Several ideas were introduced during the course of the chapter. For instance, the 
rights to content generated by machines could go to the owner of the source code or software, the 
machine itself (though corporate authorship), the owner of the machine itself, or perhaps the 
public domain. 
The fourth chapter also included subchapters on the concepts of originality, the legal personhood 
of autonomous robots, and the idea / expression dichotomy. The subchapter on originality 
discussed the capability of machines being original and creative in the same way as humans. 
Several examples were looked at, such as The Next Rembrandt. Furthermore, the opinions of 
several scholars, such as Andrés Guadamuz, Tianxiang He, and Timothy Butler were introduced 
in the chapter. The subchapter on the legal personhood of autonomous robots discussed the 
prospect of granting legal personhood to robots. The European Parliament’s e-personhood 
initiative was also discussed in part in relation to the subject of the subchapter. While there is 
still no coherent conclusion in regards to whether robots should be granted legal personhood or 
not, humanity should be prepared for robots sophisticated and advanced enough to be granted 
legal personhood. When that day comes, we should be ready to answer that question in a manner 
that satisfied the questioning side. 
The fifth chapter focused on the perspectives of the European Union as a whole and through the 
eyes of certain member states of the European Union, namely Finland and the United Kingdom. 
The chapter began with a general outline on the situation in the European Union, before moving 
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over to the individual member states of the EU. The general part included several cases of the 
CJEU that dealt with matters relating to copyright law and originality. The Infopaq case is 
especially of importance in understanding the legal stance of the European Union in regards to 
the topic of this thesis. When looking at the individual member states, Finland and the United 
Kingdom were introduced, in spite of the fact that the UK will be leaving the EU in 2021. The 
reason why the UK was chosen as one of the countries examined in this thesis is due to the UK’s 
significant impact on EU’s copyright law, and also because the UK is a common law country, as 
opposed to its counterpart in the thesis, Finland. 
The subchapter on Finland discussed the general nature of Finland’s copyright law and the legal 
system in-general, being an interesting and unique mix of different countries’ legal systems due 
to its history. Later on, several cases of the Copyright Council were introduced in the chapter for 
demonstrative purposes. Alen-Savikko had previously pointed out that news articles generated 
by machines would be eligible for copyright protection. This little detail brought some positive 
light in regards to the relationship between artificial intelligence and copyright law as it showed 
that AI-generated content could, indeed, be copyright-protected in Finland. 
The United Kingdom showed equal promise in relation to the topic of this thesis. The CDPA 
clearly allows for computer-generated content to be copyrightable. However, some of the case 
law introduced in the chapter gave a different insight on the matter: it was even suggested that 
human involvement would be required in order to surpass the threshold of originality in the UK. 
Furthermore, the decision of the Infopaq case has had an impact on UK’s copyright law, 
changing the standard used for determining the eligibility for copyright protection. However, as 
pointed out by Alen-Savikko, it is possible that when the UK leaves the EU, the UK will go back 
to its previous, more lenient standard of copyright. 
Similarly, the sixth chapter looked into the perspectives of the United States in relation to the 
topic of this thesis. In spite of being a common law country like the United Kingdom, the United 
States was shown to have a very different stance on the subject. The Copyright Act of the United 
States does not allow for non-human authors. While some scholars have proposed the works-
made-for-hire doctrine to be used in relation to machine-generated content, there is currently no 
hope for such a development to happen. The Feist Publications case holds too much merit 
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regarding the matter. The threshold of originality remains too high for machine-generated 
content to be eligible for copyright protection in the US. 
The seventh chapter examined the similarities and differences of the two continents that have 
been under the microscope of this thesis. Several similarities and differences were introduced in 
the chapter. While great attempts at harmonization have been made in relation to copyright law 
globally, even successfully, some great differences still remained between the United States and 
the European Union, stemming from historical and philosophical reasons. For instance, the 
utilitarian perspective of the United States has the interest on protecting the work itself. The 
European point of view is on the author of the work. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly 
in regards to this thesis, the concept of originality had all but been harmonized between these 
two continents. The threshold of originality in the US and the EU is simply too different for any 
cooperation to be made in regards to the matter. However, as Guadamuz had pointed out, there is 
currently some scope for harmonization, which essentially stems from the financial needs of 
small and medium-sized companies. 
Lastly, the eighth chapter introduced some future implications in relation to artificial intelligence 
and copyright law, and how the situation may change in the future. This chapter essentially 
focused on how artificial intelligence may evolve in the future, and how copyright law may 
develop along with the development of artificial intelligence and autonomous robots. Amazon’s 
Destiny was looked at as an example of need for harmonization and clarity in terms of the 
copyrightability of databases and procedurally generated content. While the future of AI is 
clouded, it is certain that AI systems will continue to be developed, and become more 
sophisticated and more advanced by each passing decade. As such, it would be a good idea to 
prepare for the future by coming up with more ways to determine how AI-generated content 
should be considered in the legal spectrum. 
